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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
FISCAL FEDERALISM AND SPATIAL INTERACTIONS
AMONG GOVERNMENTS
This dissertation examines multiple state and local expenditure categories in the
United States to expand understanding of fiscal federalism and spatial interactions
among governments. First, the author investigates the relationship between police
expenditures and crime rates from a spatial perspective. Both police expenditures
and crime rates in one state are found to exhibit a similar pattern to that in neigh-
boring states. Spatial correlation is also detected between police expenditures and
crime rates. As police of neighbors in fact deter crime at home, there are positive
externalities present among the states. Second, the author conducts new tests on
the Leviathan hypothesis, i.e., more competition, smaller government. While cost
effi ciency is used in place of government size to capture the idea that fiscal decentral-
ization reduces wasteful expenditures, spatial interaction is taken as another measure
for decentralization. The hypothesis is supported by some evidence from total, police,
highway, and welfare expenditures.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Background
On April 13, 2011, following a visit to India, Governor Steve Beshear of Kentucky
announced that he had brought a New Delhi company to the city of Elizabethtown
with an investment of 150 million dollars. The media also mentioned a tax-incentive
package in return up to 20 million dollars over the next decade1. On the same day
in Ohio, General Electric was reported to anticipate receiving 8.8 million dollars in
public funds as incentives, 1.2 million dollars of which were to come fromMontgomery
County and the city of Dayton, to build a 51-million-dollar research facility2. It might
be coincidental to see that two states announced a similar incentive plan on the same
day to stimulate investment. The fact, however, that governments in a federalist
system do not make their fiscal decisions in isolation is well-known in the public
economic literature.
As a result of tax competition for mobile resources, e.g. capital, among govern-
ments at the same level, taxes across jurisdictions tend to be set too low, causing
public goods being underprovided (Wilson, 1986; Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986;
Wilson, 1999). On the other hand, tax competition between higher- and lower-level
governments may result in tax rates being too high, since the negative impacts on
the higher level’s tax base are shared by its all jurisdictions (Flowers, 1988; Keen,
1998). The policy suggestion that prevails in this literature is tax coordination by a
1“Gov. Steve Beshear Inks Deal with India Firm for New Plan.”Boston Herald, April 13, 2011.
2“GE Receiving $8.8M in Funds to Build Dayton Research Facility.”Dayton Daily News, April
13, 2011.
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higher-level government.
From another perspective, if government, analogous to typical monopoly, is as-
sumed as a Leviathan maximizing net revenues (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980), tax
competition may reduce excess revenues, wasteful expenditures, and political rents. In
particular, Rauscher (1998), Wilson (2005), and Besley and Smart (2007) put forward
the possibility of tax competition for capital together with expenditure competition
in institutions to tame a Leviathan.
Alternatively, government expenditures may be the strategic instrument in fiscal
games among jurisdictions (Wildasin, 1988). Case et al. (1993) find that, in the
United States, an average state raises its total expenditures by over seventy cents in
response to a one-dollar increase by neighbors. Case and her coauthors also examine
four spending categories, i.e., health and human services, administration, highways,
and education, which together account for 75% of total state expenditures. Their
estimates of spatial correlation are positive and statistically significant for all the four
categories. Baicker (2005) addresses the same issue, but takes advantage of federal
mandates on state medical spending as the instrument in identifying the budget-
spillover effect. She shows that the average spending response between a state and
its neighbors is almost ninety cents for one dollar.
Spatial interaction in government expenditures may exist for a number of rea-
sons, including benefit/cost spillovers, welfare migration, and yardstick competition
(Brueckner, 2003; Revelli, 2005). Along with Haughwout (1999)’s evidence that
infrastructure in American central cities significantly increase property value in sub-
urbs, Solé-Ollé (2006) finds sizable benefit spillovers of local facilities between Spanish
urban municipalities and suburbs. With the presence of benefit spillovers and the re-
2
sulting free-rider problem, public provision across jurisdictions tends to be set at a
level lower than optimal (Sandier, 1975; Sandier and Cauley, 1976).
Welfare migration has to do with the fact that welfare programs tend to shrink tax
bases by driving the wealthy away but attracting the poor in. It thus raises a concern
that decentralization induces competing governments to “race to the bottom”, i.e.,
providing minimum welfare benefits to needy residents (Brown and Oates, 1987).
Figlio et al. (1999) show that US states are responsive to their neighbors and afraid
of taking the lead in various welfare expenditures. The evidence of underprovided
welfare benefits is also presented by Saavedra (2000) and Wheaton (2000), who both
look at interstate competition in the spending on the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) program.
Because of asymmetric information, citizens often find it diffi cult to monitor the
effort of government offi cials. However, they can evaluate their competence based
on their performance relative to that in neighboring jurisdictions. There has been
evidence of yardstick competition for tax rates (Besley and Case, 1995; Bordignon et
al., 2003; Allers and Elhorst, 2005; Bosch and Solé-Ollé, 2007), for intergovernmental
grants (Boarnet and Glazer, 2002), and for effi ciency in local public-good provision
(Geys, 2006; Revelli and Tovmo, 2007). In 1984, the Texas governor asked the state
legislature for a one-billion-dollar increase in school spending, when he found out
his state ranked last among all states in public-education expenditures (Case et al.,
1993). This anecdote suggests that governments also tend to mimic their neighboring
jurisdictions in making spending decisions.
3
1.2 Organization
Despite a large body of literature on various spatial interactions among govern-
ments, there are still important issues, including the relationship between police re-
sources and crime rates, the Leviathan hypothesis, that can be redefined and read-
dressed from a spatial perspective. For example, how do police and crime interact with
each other across jurisdictions? Do police in nearby jurisdictions help deter crime or
simply drive crime to an adjacent jurisdiction? Are government expenditures larger,
if there are sizable public sectors in neighboring jurisdictions? Is there spatial dif-
fusion in cost effi ciency among decentralized governments? This dissertation seeks
answers to these questions in its exploration to multiple government expenditures.
Expenditure categories to be examined here include elementary and secondary
education, police protection, highways, and public welfare. Chapter 2 describes some
stylized facts category by category about US state and local government expenditures
between 1977 and 2008. Over the thirty-two years, government expenditures in each
category grew fast in both nominal and real terms. Further, state governments play
an increasingly significant role in education and welfare. Using Kentucky and its
neighboring states as an example, Chapter 2 also illustrates how to construct an
average neighbor to study spatial interaction across jurisdictions. Education, police,
highway, and welfare expenditures in Kentucky are found to be higher, if its average
neighbor spends more in the same category.
Chapter 3 focuses on police protection expenditures and its interactions with
crime rates. At the beginning, a theoretical framework is constructed to facilitate
empirical investigation on spatial interactions between police expenditures and crime
rates. Prior to spatial analysis, two instrumental variables are employed to address
4
the endogeneity between police and crime. With supportive evidence of both “more
crime, more police”and “more police, less crime”, two spatially weighted police and
crime variables are introduced. Both police expenditures and crime rates are found to
exhibit spatial autocorrelation. Meanwhile, higher police expenditures in neighboring
states are found to be significantly correlated with lower crime rates at home, evidence
of positive spillovers across states. Crime rates in neighboring states, however, do not
seem to have a substantial impact on how much police spend at home.
Chapter 4 examines government expenditures on elementary and secondary ed-
ucation, police protection, highways, and public welfare. First, this chapter tests
the Leviathan hypothesis, i.e., the predicted inverse relationship between government
size and fiscal decentralization, using the conventional approach. Second, it redefines
the hypothesis as the direct relationship between government effi ciency and fiscal
decentralization. Stochastic cost frontier analysis is then applied to conducting new
tests. Third, arguing that fiscal decentralization should be measured not only within
a jurisdiction but also across jurisdictions, this chapter introduces a term of spatially
weighted government size to testing the original Leviathan hypothesis. Last, tech-
niques in both stochastic frontier analysis and spatial econometrics are employed to
test the direct relationship between government effi ciency and fiscal decentralization,
with both within- and across-jurisdiction measures included. Some findings in this
chapter confirm the Leviathan hypothesis.
1.3 Contribution
First, this dissertation expands understanding of spatial interactions among juris-
dictions. A large body of the existing literature has explored spatial autocorrelation
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in various government expenditures. A question on how government expenditures
in neighboring jurisdictions affect a common policy target in the surrounded juris-
diction, for example, leads to an avenue of research to better understand some new
aspects of spatial effects. Chapter 3 finds that police expenditures next door deter
crime at home, which also lays out an analytical framework that may be applied to
studying spatial interactions between education expenditures and graduation rates,
for example. As another extension, Chapter 4 turns to a couple of subtle aspects of
spatial interaction in government expenditures, using the measures of the expendi-
ture share in personal income and of cost effi ciency in government spending. These
two measures are more relevant to policy-decision making in addressing the extent of
government intervention.
Second, this dissertation contributes to two strands of literature that have not
been developed in a spatial perspective. The current deterrence research focuses on
breaking the simultaneity between police and crime within a jurisdiction. Chapter 3
suggests that the deterrence effect cannot be fully understood without examining the
role of police in neighboring jurisdictions. In terms of the incidence of crime, police
next door may theoretically correspond to a benefit-spillover situation or a beggar-
thy-neighbor behavior. Chapter 3 shows that the former case turns out to be present
among US states. In another literature in which the Leviathan hypothesis is tested,
decentralization is measured only within a jurisdiction by number of local govern-
ment in a state, for example. In this context, decentralization is not fully captured
without taking into account the impact of neighboring states. Besides, the Leviathan
hypothesis predicts that government is less wasteful with more decentralization and
resulting competition. In fact, wastefulness is ambiguously proxied by government
6
size in many previous studies. Government effi ciency has not been seriously taken in
testing the Leviathan hypothesis. Chapter 4 answers the calls by having measures
for intergovernmental competition both within a state and among states in testing
their impacts on both government size and cost effi ciency.
Third, this dissertation helps policy-makers better understand important factors
affecting policy effi cacy. To sell a spending proposal, government offi cials might typi-
cally discuss factors such as personal income or tax dollars to support this spending,
expected outcomes, and so on. Also, they would try to justify their proposal by com-
paring the same or similar spending across borders. In many instances, various spatial
effects of a regional policy are more often casually described than formally evaluated
in policy decision-making. Results derived from this dissertation research indicate
that various spatial interactions exist among governments, and policy outcomes in a
jurisdiction may be under- or over-estimated without considering the spatial impact
of neighboring governments. Although the estimates presented in Chapters 3 and 4
are the averages over the 48 continental states across a number of years, the impact
of a particular state on another, for example, can be estimated or forecast by locating
and interpreting the proper cell in the spatial-weight matrix.
Copyright c© Lóngjìn Chén 2012
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Chapter 2 Some Facts about State and Local Government Expenditures
The data on government expenditures to be used in later chapters are collected
from the Annual Survey of State and Local Government Finances and Census of
Governments conducted by the US Bureau of the Census. This chapter first exhibits
the time trends of the US state and local government expenditures between 1977 and
2008, and then performs simple spatial analysis to build some intuition about spatial
interactions among states.
2.1 Time Trends in State and Local Government Expenditures
Over the thirty-two years, total expenditures of all state and local governments in
the continental United States grew from 324,554 million to 2,838,836 million dollars
(Panel 1, Figure 2.1), with an average growth rate of 25.7% per year. Corrected for
inflation by consumer price index (CPI) using the average price level of 1983 and 1984
as the base, the dollar amounts of the start and end years are adjusted to 535,568
million and 1,318,531 million, respectively (Panel 2, Figure 2.1), which lead to an
average growth rate of 4.9% per year.
In 1977, the total expenditures per capita were 1,477 dollars (Panel 3, Figure 2.1),
with its CPI- converted value being 2,437 dollars (Panel 3, Figure 2.1). In 2008, the
total expenditures per capita increased to 9,327 dollars (Panel 3, Figure 2.1), with
its CPI-converted value being 4,332 (Panel 4, Figure 2.1). Thus, the nominal and
real average annual growth rates of total state and local expenditures per capita are
17.7% and 2.6%, respectively.
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This dissertation focuses on four government expenditure categories, in particular.
Namely, they are elementary and secondary education, police protection, highways,
and public welfare. The rest of this chapter explores the trend in each category in
turn.
2.1.1 Elementary and Secondary Education Expenditures
Elementary and secondary education in the United States includes kindergarten
through high school. Education, especially elementary and secondary education, is
known to generate large externalities to those who do not bear the tuition. Elemen-
tary and secondary education not only gives students better career prospects, but
also benefits their neighbors and future colleagues, for example. According to the
classic theory, the existence of externalities and the resulting underprovision prob-
lem call for government provision at an optimal level higher than that determined
in the private market. Put public education under a microscope, and another sort
of externalities can be seen among different governments. For example, high-school
graduates in rural areas choosing to go to a central city for work leave their local gov-
ernments few incentives to provide quality education. In such circumstances, state
governments can transfer a portion of revenues from the central city to rural areas
through matching grants to resolve regional distortion. The federal government as
well provides assistance to elementary and secondary education through programs
such as No Child Left Behind (NCLB).
From 71,546 million dollars in 1977 to 565,631 million dollars in 2008 (Panel 1,
Figure 2.1), the nominal growth rate of this category of expenditures by state and
local governments averages twenty-three per cent per year. The real growth rate,
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however, is 4.1%, based on the CPI-converted 118,063 million dollars of 1977 and
262,714 million dollars of 2008 (Panel 2, Figure 2.1). Meanwhile, with per-capita
amount rose annually by 15.7% on average from 326 dollars to 1,858 dollars over
the thirty-two years (Panel 3, Figure 2.1), its CPI-converted value grew annually
by two per cent on average from 537 dollars to 863 dollars (Panel 4, Figure 2.1).
As aggregated to the state level, the budget share for elementary and secondary
education was twenty-two per cent in 1977 and 19.9% in 2008, respectively (Figure
2.2).
Despite roughly the same budget share of total state and local expenditures in
1977 and in 2008, the structure of elementary and secondary education expenditures
changed dramatically over the years. Elementary and secondary education has been
funded mainly by local governments. It was not until 1982 that all the state gov-
ernments started to share the responsibility in funding (Panel 1, Figure 2.3). Over
the thirty-two years, state and local expenditures on elementary and secondary ed-
ucation increased annually by 441.0% and by 4.1% on average, respectively, with
inflation taken into account (Panel 2, Figure 2.3). In terms of CPI-converted values
per capita, state and local governments spent 317.2% and two per cent more on aver-
age each year, respectively. The dramatic shift in the responsibility can also be been
here: In 1977, only sixteen state governments had this spending category on budget,
which amounts to 0.9% of the total expenditures. In 2008, this share extended to
35.5% (Figure 2.4).
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2.1.2 Police Protection Expenditures
Police protection expenditures are used to preserve law and order as well as to
promote traffi c safety. Public safety in most cases satisfies the two characteristics
of public goods. Due to strong tax-benefit linkages (Tiebout, 1956; Oates, 1972),
police expenditures are expected to be more effi cient if they are determined locally
rather than by the state. On the other hand, with the existence of externalities across
localities, state governments have a role in information sharing, finance equalization,
and so on to ensure local public safety.
All state and local governments together spent 10,445 million and 89,676 million
dollars in 1977 and in 2008 on police protection (Panel 1, Figure 2.1). Adjusted by
CPI, police spending was 17,237 million dollars in 1977 and 41,651 million dollars
in 2008 (Panel 2, Figure 2.1). As opposed to the nominal rate of 25.3%, the real
annual average growth rate of this category of expenditures is 4.7%. In per-capita
terms, 48 dollars in 1977 and 295 dollars in 2008 were spent on police protection
(Panel 3, Figure 2.1). Their CPI-converted values are seventy-eight dollars and 137
dollars, respectively (Panel 4, Figure 2.1). The nominal and real annual growth rates
of per-capita police spending average to 17.2% and 2.5%, respectively. The share of
total state and local expenditures that police protection accounted for in 1977 and in
2008 were both 3.2% (Figure 2.2).
Police protection has been primarily a local function. While state governments
spent from 2,788 million dollars to 6,314 million dollars between 1977 and 2008, local
governments increased their expenditures on police protection from 14,650 million to
36,066 million dollars (Panel 1, Figure 2.5). The annual average growth rate of local
police spending is 4.9%, which is seven per cent higher than that of state police spend-
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ing. The per-capita amounts were twenty-one dollars by state governments and 118
dollars by local governments in 2008, while they were thirteen dollars and sixty-seven
dollars, respectively, thirty-two years ago (Panel 2, Figure 2.5). Local governments
thus spent 2.5% more on average per year, 0.4% higher than state governments did,
over the thirty-two years. Despite that police protection expenditures grew at both
state and local levels, the share between the two levels did not change dramatically –
local government made up eighty-four per cent in 1977, and 85.1% thirty-two years
later (Figure 2.6).
2.1.3 Highway Expenditures
Highway expenditures are used to construct and maintain highways, streets, an
so on. Similar to education, highways are excludable and rival by nature, but made
free because of vast externalities. For this reason, state governments, rather than
local governments, are largely responsible for this category of spending. In addition,
the federal government supports state and local governments in constructing and
maintaining the nationwide highway system, usually through matching grants.
In 1977, 23,058 million dollars were spent in this category, from which the ex-
penditures amounted to 153,515 million dollars in 2008 (Panel 1, Figure 2.1). The
nominal growth rate of highway expenditures is thus 18.9% per year on average. With
CPI-converted values of 38,049 million and 71,302 million dollars in the start and end
years, respectively, the adjusted average growth rate becomes 2.9% per year (Panel 2,
Figure 2.1). In 1977, per-capita highway expenditures were 105 dollars, and they were
504 dollars thirty-two years later (Panel 3, Figure 2.1). As CPI-converted highway
expenditures per capita were 173 and 234 dollars in 1977 and in 2008, respectively,
12
the nominal average growth rate per year, 12.7%, is roughly ten times higher than
the real rate, 1.2% (Panel 4, Figure 2.1). Highway expenditures accounted for 7.1%
of total state and local expenditures in 1977, and 5.4% thirty-two years later (Figure
2.2).
State governments always play a larger role in funding highways and related struc-
tures. State government were responsible for 28,851-million and 49,640-million-dollar,
converted by CPI, highway expenditures in 1977 and in 2008, respectively, while local
governments contributed 15,235 million and 29,462 million dollars (Panel 1, Figure
2.7). However, this spending grew faster at the local level as 3.1% per year on av-
erage than 2.4% at the state level. With state government spending 132 and 163
CPI-converted dollars per capita in 1977 and in 2008, respectively, and local gov-
ernments spending sixty-nine and ninety-seven CPI-converted dollars per capita in
the same two years, respectively, the average growth rate at the local level, 1.4%, is
two times higher than that at the state level (Panel 2, Figure 2.7). Nevertheless, the
finance structure remains stable. State governments made up sixty-five per cent of
total highway expenditures in 1977, and 62.8% thirty-two years later (Figure 2.8).
2.1.4 Public Welfare Expenditures
Public welfare expenditures aim to support needy individuals through Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), previously Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) in effect from 1935 to 1996, Supplemental Security Income (SSI),
Medicaid, and other government welfare programs. Given its nature of income redis-
tribution, welfare expenditures should be more effi cient if they are determined by state
and federal governments (Oates, 1972). The AFDC program was operated based on
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a matching-grant formula between federal and state governments. The 1996 welfare
reform created the TANF program in place of the AFDC. Based on a block-grant
arrangement, the TANF leaves state governments wide latitude in how to provide
assistance to needy families with children, how to end the dependence on govern-
ment benefits, how to reduce out-of-wedlock births, and how to promote two-parent
families.
From 1977 to 2008, with an average annual rate of 34.7%, public welfare expendi-
tures grew from 35,906 million to 409,346 million dollars (Panel 1, Figure 2.1). The
CPI-converted 59,250 million and 190,126 million dollars for the start and end years,
respectively, point to an average 7.4% increase per year (Panel 2, Figure 2.1). As
per-capita spending in this category grew from 163 to 1,345 dollars, public welfare
expenditures were 24.2% higher per year on average in the thirty-two years (Panel
3, Figure 2.1). The CPI-converted growth rate for per capita spending was 4.4% on
average per year, given 270 dollars in 1977 and 625 dollars in 2008 (Panel 4, Figure
2.1). State and local governments together spent 11.1% of their total expenditures
on public welfare in 1977, and 14.4% in 2008 (Figure 2.2).
State and local governments spent 54,091 million and 20,571 million CPI-converted
dollars, respectively, in 1977, and 191,419 million and 27,650 million dollars, respec-
tively, in 2008, which yield average annual growth rates of 8.5% and of 1.1%, respec-
tively, at each level of government (Panel 1, Figure 2.9). State governments feature
public welfare expenditures by their increasingly important role over the years. Since
the early 1990s, the federal government has shifted more responsibility to states. At
the same time, local governments exhibit a flat trend in this expenditure category.
Whereas CPI-converted state spending per capita rose by 5.2%, from 247 dollars in
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1977 to 630 dollars in 2008, local spending was actually three dollars less in 2008
than ninety-four dollars thirty-two years ago (Panel 2, Figure 2.9). In 1977, state
governments contributed 72.4% of public welfare expenditures, to which fifteen per
cent more was added in 2008 (Figure 2.10).
2.2 Spatial Interactions in State and Local Government Expenditures
To obtain some intuition about spatial interactions in state and local govern-
ment expenditures, Kentucky and its neighboring states are used for illustration. As
shown in Figure 2.11, Kentucky is geographically enclosed by seven other states, i.e.,
Virginia, West Virginia, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, and Tennessee.
Based on a simple contiguity relation, the seven states are assigned a spatial weight
of 1
7
, respectively, in determining their average impact on Kentucky. In 2008, the CPI
converted state and local total expenditures per capita of the seven states are $3.783
(Virginia), $3.503 (West Virginia), $4.162 (Ohio), $3.588 (Indiana), $4.163 (Illinois),
$3.544 (Missouri), and $3.672 (Tennessee), respectively. The 2008 CPI-converted
state and local total expenditures per capita of Kentucky’s average neighbor then are
$3.783× 1
7
+ $3.503× 1
7
+ $4.162× 1
7
+ $3.588× 1
7
+$4.163× 1
7
+ $3.544× 1
7
+ $3.672× 1
7
= $3.774.
For Kentucky in the same year, the CPI-converted state and local total expenditures
per capita are $3.738.
The simple contiguity relation assumes that each neighboring state has an equal
share of the total spatial impact on Kentucky. It is maybe the case, however, that
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Ohio and Illinois have greater influences than West Virginia on Kentucky, because
the former two are larger states in terms of population. For this consideration, the
simple contiguity relation is adjusted by annual average population between 1977
and 2008. The population-adjusted spatial weights for the seven neighboring states
of Kentucky are 0.135 (Virginia), 0.039 (West Virginia), 0.233 (Ohio), 0.122 (Indiana),
0.250 (Illinois), 0.112 (Missouri), and 0.109 (Tennessee), respectively, based on which
the 2008 CPI-converted state and local total expenditures per capita of Kentucky’s
average neighbor then are
$3.783× 0.135 + $3.503× 0.039 + $4.162× 0.233 + $3.588× 0.122
+$4.163× 0.250 + $3.544× 0.112 + $3.672× 0.109
= $3.893.
Each method of assigning spatial weights has its benefits and costs. The popu-
lation adjusted spatial weights are more sophisticated than simple contiguity ones.
However, using this method, Missouri is assigned a larger weight than Tennessee. Ten-
nessee in fact shares much longer borders with Kentucky than Missouri, and longer
shared borders are conjectured to promote more spatial interactions. Although it is
not considered in the following chapters, the simple contiguity relation may also be
adjusted by border length. Besides contiguity spatial weights, using inverse distance
between two geographic centers to define spatial relations is another common method
in practice. Simple inverse-distance spatial weights too may to adjusted by popula-
tion, personal income, immigration flows, and so on. In formal analysis, a square
matrix is constructed with such spatial weights in it. Zeros are assigned to the cells
on the diagonal of the spatial matrix to reflect the fact that there is no spatial relation
between a state and itself.
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The CPI-converted state and local total expenditures per capita of Kentucky and
its average neighbor between 1977 and 2008 are graphed in Figure 2.12. In the
upper panel, these two sequences move up together with a time trend. To detrend
these two sequences, they are regressed on a linear time trend and their regression
residuals are plotted in the lower panel. Kentucky and its average neighbor are
shown intertwined with possibly positive correlation. Figure 2.13 visualizes simple
correlation between Kentucky and its average neighbor in CPI-converted state and
local total expenditures per capita. The upper and lower panels are based on raw
and detrended data, respectively, both showing positive spatial correlation.
Using the same approach to individual categories of government expenditures,
similar results are found between Kentucky and its average neighbor. CPI-converted
state and local total expenditures per capita on elementary and secondary education
(Figure 2.14), on police protection (Figure 2.16), on highways (Figure 2.18), and on
public welfare (Figure 2.20) are all seen move together closely on time-series plots,
both with and without a time trend. Meanwhile, on scatter plots, positive correlation
between Kentucky and its average neighbor holds for CPI-converted state and local
total expenditures per capita on elementary and secondary education (Figure 2.15),
on police protection (Figure 2.17), on highways (Figure 2.19), and on public welfare
(Figure 2.21), both with and without a time trend.
2.3 Summary
As shown in this chapter, state and local government expenditures increased sig-
nificantly during the past thirty-two years. Elementary and secondary education as
well as police protection remains a local government function, despite of substantial
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education transfers from state governments. State governments play a large role in
highways and in public welfare. Especially in public welfare, more discretion has been
granted from the federal government, since the 1996 welfare reform.
Based on population-adjusted contiguity relations between Kentucky and each
of its neighboring states, namely Virginia, West Virginia, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois,
Missouri, and Tennessee, an average neighbor is created for Kentucky to provide some
illustrative analysis on spatial interactions among states. Positive spatial correlation
is found in state and local government expenditures on elementary and secondary
education, on police protection, on highways, as well as on public welfare.
In the following two chapters, various spatial interactions among governments are
studied formally, using the state and local government finance data described above.
In Chapter 3, police protection expenditures are further examined with crime rates
from a spatial perspective. In Chapter 4, expenditures on elementary and secondary
education, highways, and public welfare are taken as the costs of multiple publicly
provided goods and services to estimate a stochastic frontier and generate effi ciency
scores.
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Figure 2.1: Time Trends in State-Local Government Expenditures: Total
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Figure 2.1: Time Trends in State-Local Government Expenditures: Total (Continued)
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Figure 2.2: Decomposition of State-Local Government Expenditures: Total
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Figure 2.3: Time Trends in State-Local Government Expenditures: Elementary and
Secondary Education
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Figure 2.4: Decomposition of State-Local Government Expenditures: Elementary
and Secondary Education
0.9%
99.1%
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
1977
El & Se Education, State (0.9%)
El & Se Education, Local (99.1%)
35.5%
64.5%
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
2008
El & Se Education, State (35.5%)
El & Se Education, Local (64.5%)
23
Figure 2.5: Time Trends in State-Local Government Expenditures: Police Protection
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Figure 2.6: Decomposition of State-Local Government Expenditures: Police Protec-
tion
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Figure 2.7: Time Trends in State-Local Government Expenditures: Highway
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Figure 2.8: Decomposition of State-Local Government Expenditures: Highway
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Figure 2.9: Time Trends in State-Local Government Expenditures: Public Welfare
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Figure 2.10: Decomposition of State-Local Government Expenditures: Public Welfare
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Figure 2.11: Kentucky and Its Neighboring States
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Figure 2.12: Spatial Interactions in State-Local Government Expenditures: Total (a)
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Figure 2.13: Spatial Interactions in State-Local Government Expenditures: Total (b)
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Figure 2.14: Spatial Interactions in State-Local Government Expenditures: Elemen-
tary and Secondary Education (a)
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Figure 2.15: Spatial Interactions in State-Local Government Expenditures: Elemen-
tary and Secondary Education (b)
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Figure 2.16: Spatial Interactions in State-Local Government Expenditures: Police
Protection (a)
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Figure 2.17: Spatial Interactions in State-Local Government Expenditures: Police
Protection (b)
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Figure 2.18: Spatial Interactions in State-Local Government Expenditures: Highway
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Figure 2.19: Spatial Interactions in State-Local Government Expenditures: Highway
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Figure 2.20: Spatial Interactions in State-Local Government Expenditures: Public
Welfare (a)
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Figure 2.21: Spatial Interactions in State-Local Government Expenditures: Public
Welfare (b)
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Chapter 3 The Game between Police and Crime: When Neighbors Come
into Play
3.1 Introduction
Where there is more crime, we tend to see more police. With more police, crime
should be reduced. This intuition is not hard to comprehend for criminologists, soci-
ologists, or economists. They, however, find it diffi cult to identify the expected causal
relationship between police resources and crime rates with solid evidence. More sur-
prisingly, police are even shown to result in more crime in a number of studies. As its
first task, this chapter is to use the instrumental-variable approach in a simultaneous
system to revisit the conventional wisdom of “more crime, more police”and “more
police, less crime”with empirical evidence.
Whether police expenditures and crime rates share a similar pattern among neigh-
boring jurisdictions is another question to explore in this chapter. To justify their
proposal to hire ten new offi cers, the police chief of Richland Township in Bucks
County, PA claimed that their force was understaffed compared to neighboring de-
partments1. Illegal activities, on the other hand, may exhibit spatial correlation too.
For example, thefts and drug dealing that start in one place often sneak into neigh-
boring communities and even develop into an epidemic of crime. This chapter is also
to uncover the evidence of spatial diffusion in police expenditures and in crime rates.
Theoretically, reenforced police in one place may either crack down on crime or
drive it out into neighboring communities. In a dramatic story according to the police
1“More Police Could Mean More Taxes.”The Intelligencer, March 23, 2008.
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department of Fayetteville County, NC, their police offi cers chased suspects in a car
for forty-five minutes, during which they drove into neighboring Harnett, Spring Lake
and Fort Bragg Counties and back into Fayetteville, until the chased car ran out of
gas2. This can be seen as a benefit-spillover situation in which Harnett, Spring Lake,
and Fort Bragg benefit from dutiful police offi cers of Fayetteville without payment.
If the Fayetteville police offi cers had stopped at their county borders, it would be
taken as a beggar-thy-neighbor behavior that leaves alone surrounding communities
with more crime. Overall, do police of neighbors help to reduce crime at home? The
answer to this question is to be revealed in this chapter too.
This chapter contributes to the existing literature by using the instrumental-
variable approach to confirm the intuition of “more crime, more police”“more police,
less crime”and by using generalized spatial three-stage least squares to explore the re-
lationship between police resources and crime rates from a spatial perspective. More
specifically, this chapter detects spatial autocorrelation in both police expenditures
and crime rates. The results also show that more police expenditures of neighbors
drive down crime rates at home, a benefit-spillover situation with positive externali-
ties. Crime rates of neighbors, however, do not seem to be a critical decision factor
affecting the police budget at home.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 briefly reviews
the existing literature on the relationship between police resources and crime rates.
A theoretical framework is presented in Section 3.3. It is followed by empirical esti-
mation based on various non-spatial and spatial specifications in Section 3.4. Section
3.5 concludes.
2http://local.nixle.com/alert/4771066
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3.2 Literature Review
Police and crime are believed to have a impact on each other. Researchers, how-
ever, have found much less evidence of “more police, less crime”than of “more crime,
more police”. In an early survey by Cameron (1988), only 4 out of 22 studies are
reported finding a significant negative impact of police on crime. Among the research
surveyed by Marvell and Moody (1996), while 15 out of 21 studies suggesting “more
crime, more police”, only 10 out of 29 pieces provide the evidence of “more police,
less crime”. Although it sounds like an obvious and important question that needs
to be addressed, the answer to whether police deter crime largely remains a puzzle
to researchers.
Among puzzled researchers, one thing seems clear though – the simultaneous
determination of police and crime, which is likely to bias the estimates, if not con-
trolled for. Omitted-variable bias is another specification problem in the deterrence
research. Marvell and Moody (1996) suggest four categories of proxies to deal with
incomplete control variables, namely individual fixed effects, time fixed effects, time
trends, and lagged dependent variables. Individual fixed effects, for example, cannot
be meaningfully specified for either time-series or cross-section data; the advantage
of panel data to controlling for unobserved heterogeneity is actually discussed earlier
by Cornwell and Trumbull (1994).
Marvell and Moody (1996) employ vector autoregressions and test for Granger
causality3 between police and crime. Besides police employment, crime rates, and
their lagged values, various other control variables are included in their specifications.
3As Marvell and Moody (1996) point out, Granger causality can differ from standard causality in
that (1) a third factor may cause Granger causality between two factors, (2) Granger causality does
not account for adjustments based on accurate expectations, and (3) Granger causality understates
instantaneous causation by using lagged values only.
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Including state or city dummies, year dummies, and state or city trends, but not
other control variables, turns out to change the results dramatically. Their tests
detect Granger causation in both directions, with the impact of police employment
on crime rates stronger than the impact of the latter on the former. Kovandzic and
Sloan (2002) later apply the same idea to county-level data, and confirm the Marvell
and Moody (1996) conclusions.
Greenwood and Wadycki (1973) estimate a simultaneous system to allow for two-
way causation between police and crime. They, however, show that, no matter in
which direction, police expenditures and crime rates have a positive relationship.
Taking a simultaneous-equation approach too, Hakim et al. (1979) find that the
elasticity of per-capita police expenditures with respect to property crime rates is
1.91, while a one-dollar increase in per-capita police expenditures actually leads to a
33% decrease in property crime rates. Craig (1987) suggests that the distinction made
between actual and reported crime is essential to identifying a significant deterrent
effect with his elasticity estimate of -0.57.
In alternative single-equation estimations of the deterrent effect, instrumental
variables correlated with police resources but not with crime rates are heavily relied
on. Levitt (1997) believed that election-year dummies served the purpose for identifi-
cation, until McCrary (2002) detects a coding error by Levitt (1997) that reverses all
the findings. Levitt (2002) later proposes firefighter employment as a plausible instru-
ment for police employment, whereas Lin (2009) considers tax rates set at a higher
level of government. Both Levitt (2002) and Lin (2009) find police deterring crime.
In addition, taking the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) grants as the
instrument, Evans and Owens (2007) and Worrall and Kovandzic (2010) provide the
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evidence of reduced crime by added police.
Police take terrorist attacks seriously. So do researchers. Di Tella and Schargrod-
sky (2004) and Klick and Tabarrok (2005) argue that a terrorist attack, either actual
or potential, creates a quasi-natural experiment by which the deterrent effect can be
tested for. According to their results, crime declines significantly, as more police go
on street patrols.
There have been studies on spatial autocorrelation in both police expenditures
and crime rates. For example, Rincke (2010) shows that police spending in New
England is spatially correlated and robust to various specifications of the spatial
weight matrix. On the other hand, Morenoff et al. (2001) and Baller et al. (2001)
present evidence of homicide diffusion in Chicago neighborhoods and in southern US
counties, respectively. Thus far, however, the literature on the relationship between
police resources and crime rates pays little attention to spatial analysis. Hakim et
al. (1979) make an early attempt to incorporate spatial thinking into their general-
equilibrium analysis on police and crime. Using the average value of per-capita police
expenditures with estimated coeffi cients that determine the derived slope of a reaction
function, they demonstrate that per-capita police expenditures raise by five cents in
response to a one-dollar increase by neighbors. However, due to informal econometric
treatment, they were unable to make inference with their spatial estimate. This
chapter fills the gap in the existing literature by investigating whether and how police
expenditures next door affect crime rates at home, and vice versa.
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3.3 Theoretical Framework
Suppose that the total utility of the residents in the ith jurisdiction is a function
of crime rates Ci and other attributes zi, i.e., Ui = U (Ci, zi). Ci is assumed to
be a function of police expenditures at home Pi and the weighted average of police
expenditures of neighboring jurisdictions WP , i.e.,
Ci = C (Pi,WP ) , where
∂Ci
∂Pi
< 0. (3.1)
The government of the ith jurisdiction is then assumed to maximize the total utility of
its residents by choosing optimal spending on Pi and zi, given the budget constrained
by mi, i.e.,
maxU (Ci, zi) = max
Pi,zi
U [C (Pi,WP ) , zi]
s. t. Pi + zi = mi
Solving this maximization problem leads to the equilibrium characterized by
P ∗i = P
∗ (WP ) , (3.2)
C∗i = C
∗ (WP ) . (3.3)
Total differentiating using Equations (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3) yields
dP ∗i =
∂Pi
∂Ci
· dC∗i +
∂Pi
∂WP
· dWP , (3.4)
dC∗i =
∂Ci
∂Pi
· dP ∗i +
∂Ci
∂WP
· dWP . (3.5)
Solving Equations (3.4) and (3.5) gives
dP ∗i
dWP
=
∂Pi
∂Ci
· ∂Ci
∂WP
+ ∂Pi
∂WP
1− ∂Pi
∂Ci
· ∂Ci
∂Pi
, (3.6)
dC∗i
dWP
=
∂Ci
∂Pi
· ∂Pi
∂WP
+ ∂Ci
∂WP
1− ∂Pi
∂Ci
· ∂Ci
∂Pi
, (3.7)
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where
(
1− ∂Pi
∂Ci
· ∂Ci
∂Pi
)
> 0.
The sign of dP
∗
i
dWP
could be positive, negative, or zero. dP
∗
i
dWP
> 0 is interpreted as
positive spatial interaction in police expenditures. That is, if its neighbors increase
police expenditures, the locality will respond with the same policy. With respect
to dC
∗
i
dWP
, a positive sign in front suggests that police of neighbors drive crime into a
surrounded jurisdiction, a beggar-thy-neighbor behavior with negative externalities,
while a negative sign indicates that police next door help to reduce crime at home, a
benefit-spillover situation with positive externalities.
If crime of neighbors is alternatively taken as an exogenous determinant, the
decision-making function of police expenditures then becomes Pi = P (Ci,WC), and
the “production function”of crime rates now is Ci = C (Pi,WC), where WC is the
weighted average of crime rates of neighbors. By total differentiation and substitution,
the slopes of two other best-response functions are obtained, i.e.,
dP ∗i
dWC
=
∂Pi
∂Ci
· ∂Ci
∂WC
+ ∂Pi
∂WC
1− ∂Pi
∂Ci
· ∂Ci
∂Pi
, (3.8)
dC∗i
dWC
=
∂Ci
∂Pi
· ∂Pi
∂WC
+ ∂Ci
∂WC
1− ∂Pi
∂Ci
· ∂Ci
∂Pi
. (3.9)
The sign of dP
∗
i
dWC
reflects how crime next door affects the financial decision on
police protection, which could be positive or negative. dP
∗
i
dWC
= 0 would imply that
the decision-making on police expenditures does not take into account the impact of
crime next door. As for dC
∗
i
dWC
, its sign is expected to be positive, if an epidemic of
crime is present.
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3.4 Empirical Implementation
3.4.1 Data Description
The data for empirical analysis are from the 48 continental US states from 1989
to 2008. Summary statistics for each variable are listed in Table 3.1.
State and local police expenditures and the total crime rate are the dependent
variable for each equation. Since final decisions on police protection are actually made
by government of counties, cities, and their equivalents, it would be better to analyze
police spending at the local level, given data availability. This chapter proposes the
incarceration rate and the highway fatality rate as the instruments for endogenous
crime and police variables, respectively. The data on these two instrumental variables,
to the author’s knowledge, are either unavailable or incomplete at the local level. Data
on educational attainment and some other attributes are in shortage too for counties
and their equivalents. Missing values raise more concern in spatial analysis than in
other topics, because they result in a failure of calculating spatial weighted averages
in a meaningful way. There has been research on the relationship between police
resources and crime rates at the state level. If Marvell and Moody (1996) are correct
in pointing out that the relationship between police resources and crime rates is likely
to be understated in state-level analysis, the significant results from this chapter are
expected to be confirmed with richer policy implications in future local-level inquiries.
On the other hand, the total crime rate, dependent variable in the other equation,
is not free of criticism either. The total number of crimes reported to police is aggre-
gated not only from counties and their equivalents, but also from four types of violent
crimes, i.e., murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and ag-
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gravated assault, and three types of property crimes, i.e., burglary, larceny-theft,
and motor vehicle theft. Beside aggregation bias, reporting bias is another potential
problem (Levitt, 1998) with this crime index. Since state-local police expenditures
are chosen as one dependent variable, the total crime rate in a state is accordingly
selected to be the other dependent variable in the simultaneous system.
As a control variable in the police equation, personal income is expected to be
associated with greater demand for public safety. The percentage of House Democrats
and the dummy for Democrat governors, which are not highly correlated in these data,
control for the political environment in a state. The highway fatality rate is used as an
instrumental variable for police expenditures, as the former is likely to be negatively
correlated with the latter, but not correlated with the crime rate.
For the reason of crime likely to prevail in highly populated areas, population
density accounts for the location choice of crime. Demographic characteristics such
as population by age and by race are included in almost all the studies reviewed
previously. Higher educational attainment tends to increase the opportunity costs of
crime (Witte and Tauchen, 1994; Lochner and Moretti, 2004; Lochner, 2004), while
a higher unemployment rate is believed to go opposite (Witte and Tauchen, 1994;
Raphael and Winter-Ember, 2001; Gould et al., 2002). Expected to be correlated
with the crime rate (Marvell and Moody, 1994; Levitt, 1996), but not correlated with
police expenditures, as correctional expenditures are another spending category, the
incarceration rate serve as an instrumental variable for the crime rate.
The statistics on government expenditures per capita, total population and land
area, population by age and by race, and educational attainment are accessible at the
Bureau of the Census. The Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Bureau of Labor
49
Statistics are responsible for the data on personal income and labor force, respectively.
The information on the party affi liation of state legislators and governors is kept track
of at the Council of State Governments. Some of the state characteristics data are
pooled and maintained by the University of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research,
which are publicly available at their Website4. Crime rates are published in the
Uniform Crime Reports by Federal Bureau of Investigation, while incarceration rates
are monitored at the Bureau of Justice Statistics. Highway fatality rates are obtained
from the National Highway Traffi c Safety Administration.
3.4.2 Impacts on Police Expenditures: Single-Equation Estimation
In conventional studies on the determinants of police expenditures, the regression
equation would take a form as
lnPit = θ lnCit + x
T
itβ + ai + ζt + εit, (3.10)
where jurisdictions are indexed by subscripts i and j, and time periods by t. lnP
and lnC denote police protection expenditures per capita and the total crime rate
reported, respectively, in natural logarithmic form. In this chapter, control variables
in xTit include the natural logarithm of per-capita personal income, the percentage of
House Democrats, and a dummy for Democrat governors. ai and ζt are dummies to
control individual effects and time effects, respectively. εit is an error term assumed
normally distributed. θ and β are unknown parameters.
Since there is simultaneity between police and crime, lnC should be handled as
an endogenous variable by one or more instrumental variables that are correlated
with lnC, but not with lnP . The incarceration rate is commonly used as a con-
4http://www.ukcpr.org/AvailableData.aspx
50
trol variable in estimating the impact of police on crime (e.g., Marvell and Moody,
1996; Levitt, 2002). Using an instrumental-variable approach, Levitt (1996) identifies
strong and negative causal effect of prison population on crime. Marvell and Moody
(1994) demonstrate that larger state prison population Granger-causes less crime, al-
though they acknowledge the causality theoretically in the other direction. As shown
in Table 3.2, the correlation between the incarceration rate and the crime rate is
statistically significant but positive. If, as the positive sign suggests, simultaneity
is present between prison population and crime, having the incarceration rate as a
control variable for the crime rate would demand extra instruments. Excluding the
incarceration rate, however, not only avoids searching for extra instruments for the
crime equation, but also saves an instrument for the crime rate in the police equation.
On the other hand, correctional expenditures are a separate category of government
spending. As prison population that is highly correlated with crime is believed to
affect police expenditures through crime only, the incarceration rate is a legitimate
instrumental variable for the crime rate.
Empirical results based on ordinary least squares (OLS) and on two-stage least
squares (2SLS) using the incarceration rate as an instrumental variable are presented
in Table 3.3. While the positive relationship between crime and police remains, the
impact on police expenditures enlarges from 0.21% to 0.56% in response to a 1%
higher crime rate. In addition, as seen here and later as well, personal income is a
strong predictor of police expenditures.
To take into account the spatial impact of police expenditures, Equation (3.10) is
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extended to
lnPit = ρ
∑
j
wij lnPjt + φ
∑
j
wij lnPjt · lnCit
+θ lnCit + x
T
itβ + ai + ζt + εit, (3.11)
with
εit = λ
ε
∑
j
wijεjt + µit, (3.12)
where wij denotes a weight matrix element determining the relative influence of the
jth jurisdiction on the ith, ρ measures the impact of police expenditures by average
neighbor, φ accounts for the interaction between police expenditures of neighbors and
crime rates at home, λε captures potential spatial autocorrelation in the error term
ε, and µit is assumed normally distributed.
The spatial-weight matrix to create an average neighbor may take various forms in
defining spatial relations. For a contiguity matrix, for example, if the ith jurisdiction
is adjacent to the jth, the ith is assigned a weight wij = 1Ni , where Ni is the total
number of the ith’s neighbors. If the ith and the jth are non-neighbors, both are
assigned a weight wij = 0. Note that a jurisdiction is not considered to be a neighbor
of itself, i.e., wii = 0. Employed this chapter is a population-adjusted contiguity
matrix. In contrast to a regular contiguity matrix treating each neighbor equally,
a population-adjusted contiguity matrix gives more weight on populous jurisdictions
that are probably of greater influence on others, i.e., wij =
Popj
PopNi
for i’s neighbor j,
where Popj and PopNi refer to the average annual populations of the jth and of all
Ni neighbors of the ith, respectively, between 1989 and 2008.
For Equations (3.11) and (3.12), imposing λε = 0 leads to a spatial-lag model,
while with ρ = 0 and φ = 0, a spatial-error model is formed. OLS, if applied to
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spatial-lag models, will give biased estimates by ignoring spatial lags. The OLS
estimates from spatial-error models are consistent in general. However, they are
ineffi cient even for large samples, and thus responsible for misleading hypothesis test
results. Kelejian and Prucha (1998) propose a generalized spatial two-stage least
squares (GS2SLS) procedure to deal with both spatial lags and errors. The first
step is to implement 2SLS to estimate Equation (3.11), with endogenous spatial
lags instrumented by the weighted averages of neighbors’exogenous characteristics
x. In the current case, lnC needs instrumenting by incarceration rate first. lnP
is then predicted using the fitted value of lnC, along with the natural logarithm
of population density, the percentage of ages between 18 and 24, the percentage of
African American population, the percentage of ages 25 and over with a bachelor’s
degree or higher, the unemployment rate, and the incarceration rate. It is followed by
using 2SLS residuals to estimate the spatial-error parameter λε. Then multiply the
matrix of right-hand-side variables on the left by
(
I− λ̂εW
)
to correct for spatial
errors, where I is an NT × NT identity matrix, W is an NT × NT block—diagonal
spatial-weight matrix, N is the total number of states, and T is the total number of
time periods. Lastly, apply 2SLS again to the transformed equation. The estimates
produced by this procedure are expected to be both consistent and effi cient. The
GS2SLS technique was originally developed for a cross-section setting. This chapter
extends its application to panel data, using state and year dummies to control for
two-way fixed effects.
In Column (1) of Table 3.4, the interaction term
∑
j
wij lnPjt · lnCit is not in-
cluded in the GS3SLS procedure. Police expenditures are found spatial correlated
at a significance level lower than 1%. Other things being equal, a home state raises
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its police budget by 0.65% on average, in response to an average neighbor increasing
police expenditures by 1%. “More crime, more police”remains the case, despite of
lower statistical and economic significance. In a single-equation setup, how police
expenditures of neighbors affect crime rates at home can be seen by having an inter-
action term. In Column (2) of Table 3.4, the coeffi cient estimate of the interaction
term is negative and statistically significant, indicating a case of positive externalities.
Spatial autocorrelation in the error term is shown statistically insignificant in both
columns.
Alternatively, to see how crime rates of neighbors interact with both police expen-
ditures and crime rates at home in a single-equation setup, spatial terms
∑
j
wij lnPjt
and
∑
j
wij lnPjt·lnCit in Equation (3.11) are replaced with
∑
j
wij lnCjt and
∑
j
wij lnCjt·
lnCit, respectively, such that
lnPit = ρ̃
∑
j
wij lnCjt + φ̃
∑
j
wij lnCjt · lnCit
+θ lnCit + x
T
itβ + ai + ζt + εit, (3.13)
with Equation (3.12) still applying, where ρ̃ measures the impact of crime rates of
neighbors on police expenditures at home, and φ̃ highlights spatial interaction in
crime rates.
As the only endogenous variable, lnC is instrumented by incarceration rate in
the first step of implementing GS2SLS. In Column (3) of Table 3.4, crime rates of
neighbors do not show an statistically significant impact on police expenditures at
home. In Column (4) of Table 3.4, however, crime rates are seen highly spatially
correlated through the interaction term
∑
j
wij lnCjt · lnCit. Still in a single-equation
setup, spatial autocorrelation in crime rates is to be more formally examined in the
following subsection.
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3.4.3 Impacts on Crime Rates: Single-Equation Estimation
A regression on crime rates in terms of police expenditures and other potential
determinants, a counterpart to Equation (3.10), is written as
lnCit = δ lnPit + y
T
itγ + di + ξt + ηit, (3.14)
where, lnP and lnC, as well as i, j, and t, are defined as before. Control variables
included in yTit are the natural logarithm of population density, the percentage of ages
between 18 and 24, the percentage of African American population, the percentage of
ages 25 and over with a bachelor’s degree or higher, the unemployment rate. di and
ξt are dummies for two-way fixed effects. ηit is a normally distributed error term. δ
and γ are unknown parameters.
In the deterrence literature, researchers have been hunting for instruments for
police variables (e.g., Levitt, 2002; Evans and Owens, 2007; Lin, 2009; Worrall and
Kovandzic, 2010). This chapter proposes the highway fatality rate as an instrumental
variable for police expenditures. Traffi c fatalities are expected to be correlated with
highway policing and control, but not with crime, which meet the criteria for a
valid instrument. Table 3.5 presents the results of police expenditures regressed on
highway fatality rates, both in natural logarithm. In Column (1), when year dummies
are included, neither state nor year dummies pass the F-test for joint insignificance.
Plus, the coeffi cient estimate in front of the fatality rate is statistically insignificant.
If state dummies are specified only, as seen in Column (2), fatality rates and police
expenditures are highly correlated.
The OLS results in Column (1) of Table 3.6 show a statistically significant and
positive relationship between police expenditures and crime rates, probably due to un-
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controlled endogeneity of police expenditures. With year dummies included and 2SLS
implemented, the coeffi cient estimate of police expenditures becomes surprisingly pos-
itive with a huge standard error. After insignificant year dummies are dropped, the
deterrence effect of police on crime is seen statistically significant. That is, as police
expenditures rise by 1%, crime rates fall by 0.44% on average, holding other factors
constant.
To account for the spatial impact of crime rates, Equation (3.14) is modified as
lnCit = π
∑
j
wij lnCjt + ϕ
∑
j
wij lnCjt · lnPit
+δ lnPit + y
T
itγ + di + ξt + ηit, (3.15)
with
ηit = λ
η
∑
j
wijηjt + νit, (3.16)
where wij denotes a weight matrix element defined as before, π measures the strength
of spatial interaction in crime rates, ϕ comes along with the interaction term of crime
rates of neighbors and police expenditures at home, λη is a spatial-error parameter
similar to λε, and νit is assumed normally distributed.
In the first step of the GS2SLS procedure, lnP is instrumented by fatality rate in
natural logarithmic form, and then lnC is instrumented by a set of variables including
the fitted value of lnP , the natural logarithm of per-capita personal income, the
percentage of House Democrats, and a dummy for Democrat governors. The GS2SLS
results are presented in the first two columns of Table 3.7.
Consistent with what the coeffi cient estimate of the interaction term
∑
j
wij lnCjt ·
lnCit suggests in Column (4) of Table 3.4, spatial interaction in crime rates is seen
significant, both statistically and economically, in Column (1) of Table 3.7. That is, if
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crime rates are 1% higher on average in neighboring states, the surrounded state will
face a 1.63% jump in crime rates, other things being equal. With the deterrence effect
continuing to hold, inclusion of the interaction term
∑
j
wij lnCjt · lnPit in Column (2)
of Table 3.7 identifies a positive relationship between crime of neighbors and police
at home. This spatial relationship, however, was found insignificant in Column (3)
of Table 3.4.
Replacing
∑
j
wij lnCjt and
∑
j
wij lnCjt · lnPit with
∑
j
wij lnPjt and
∑
j
wij lnPjt ·
lnPit , respectively, to examine the spatial impact of police expenditures, Equation
(3.15) becomes
lnCit = π̃
∑
j
wij lnPjt + ϕ̃
∑
j
wij lnPjt · lnPit
+δ lnPit + y
T
itγ + di + ξt + ηit, (3.17)
with Equation (3.16) still applying, where π̃ and ϕ̃ point to the interaction between
police expenditures of neighbors and crime rates and police expenditures, respectively,
at home.
When implementing GS2SLS in the first step, the only endogenous variable lnP
is instrumented by natural logarithm of the fatality rate. Column (3) of Table 3.7
suggests that police of neighbors help to deter crime at home, a case of externalities
previously seen in Column (2) of Table 3.4. More interestingly, neighbors play a larger
role in cracking down crime at home. Include the interaction term into the regression,
and the coeffi cient estimate is found statistically significant but negative in Column
(4) of Table 3.7. This finding is contradictory to positive spatial autocorrelation in
police expenditures revealed in Column (1) of Table 3.4.
57
3.4.4 Interactions between Police Expenditures and Crime Rates in a
Simultaneous System
Compared to single equations, a simultaneous-equation system not only produces
more effi cient estimates in general, but also facilitates the investigation on various
spatial interactions between police and crime. Before examining these spatial inter-
actions, Equations (3.10) and (3.14) are jointly estimated to provide some baseline
results for later comparison. The conventional simultaneous system to investigate the
relationship between police resources and crime rates takes the form as
lnPit = θ lnCit + x
T
itβ + ai + ζt + εit, (3.10)
lnCit = δ lnPit + y
T
itγ + di + ξt + ηit. (3.14)
The baseline 3SLS results are given in Table 3.8. In Column (1.2), with year dum-
mies included in the crime equation, more police are seen producing more crime, even
though the instrumental variable is at work. Since, as shown before, year dummies
are not jointly significant in Equation (3.14), they are dropped in Column (2.2) for
an reexamination. With both year and state dummies in Equation (3.10), but year
dummies only in Equation (3.14), 1% higher crime rates lead to on average 0.51%
higher police expenditures and 1% higher police expenditures result in on average
0.46% lower crime rates, respectively, holding other factors constant in the system.
In other words, using instrumental variables to break simultaneity between police and
crime, both “more crime, more police”and “more police, less crime”are identified in
the simultaneous system. The 3SLS results are similar to the 2SLS results in Tables
3.3 and 3.6.
To allow for neighbors coming into play, the simultaneous system above is reformed
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as 
lnPit = ρ
∑
j
wij lnPjt + φ
∑
j
wij lnPjt · lnCit
+θ lnCit + x
T
itβ + ai + ζt + εit, (3.11)
lnCit = π
∑
j
wij lnCjt + ϕ
∑
j
wij lnCjt · lnPit
δ lnPit + y
T
itγ + di + ξt + ηit, (3.15)
with spatial terms of police expenditures in Equation (3.11) and spatial terms of
crime rates in Equation (3.15). In addition, to take into account potential spatial
autocorrelation in errors, a spatial-error parameter λ is jointly estimated using the
information of all residuals, i.e.,
εit
· · ·
ηit
· · ·
 = λ

∑
j
wijεjt
· · ·∑
j
wijηjt
· · ·
+

µit
· · ·
νit
· · ·
 . (3.18)
Based on GS2SLS (Kelejian and Prucha, 1998) for a single-equation setup, Kele-
jian and Prucha (2004) propose a generalized spatial three-stage least squares (GS3SLS)
procedure to deal with simultaneous systems containing both spatial lags and spatial
errors. In the current context, the first step is to implement 2SLS to estimate Equa-
tions (3.11) and (3.15), with endogenous police and crime variables instrumented
by fatality rate and incarceration rate, respectively, and then with their spatial lags
instrumented by their fitted values and weighted averages of neighbors’exogenous
characteristics, respectively. It is followed by using 2SLS residuals to jointly estimate
the spatial-error parameters λ. Then multiply the matrix of all right-hand-side vari-
ables on the left by
(
I− λ̂W
)
to correct for spatial errors, where I is an NT ×NT
identity matrix, W is an NT × NT block—diagonal spatial-weight matrix with the
population-adjusted contiguity matrices on the principal diagonal, N is the total
number of jurisdictions, and T is the total number of periods. Lastly, apply 2SLS
again to the transformed equations to obtain both unbiased and effi cient estimates.
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Shown in Table 3.9, the expected relationships of “more crime, more police”and
“more police, less crime” both remain within a state. Meanwhile, both police ex-
penditures and crime rates exhibit strong spatial autocorrelation. On average, police
expenditures and crime rates at home jump up by 1.38% and by 1.42%, respectively,
as a response to a 1% increase in police expenditures and crime rates, respectively,
of neighbors, other things being equal. A more careful interpretation of this large
spatial coeffi cient estimate calls for further investigation. The relationships captured
by interaction terms are as found before. That is, police of neighbors negatively in-
teract with crime at home, while crime of neighbors positively interact with police at
home, both being statistically significant. GS3SLS results in Table 3.9 are consistent
with GS2SLS results in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.4 and of Table 3.7 combined.
Last but not least, the estimate of spatial-error parameters is statistically significant,
which is in favor of GS3SLS accounting for both spatial-lag or -error models.
To focus on the spatial impacts of police expenditures, Equations (3.11) and (3.17)
are put into a simultaneous system, i.e.,
lnPit = ρ
∑
j
wij lnPjt + φ
∑
j
wij lnPjt · lnCit
+θ lnCit + x
T
itβ + ai + ζt + εit, (3.11)
lnCit = π̃
∑
j
wij lnPjt + ϕ̃
∑
j
wij lnPjt · lnPit
δ lnPit + y
T
itγ + di + ξt + ηit, (3.17)
with Equation (3.18). Columns (1.1) and (1.2) of Table 3.10, show that higher police
expenditures of neighbors lead to higher police expenditures and lower crime rates at
home. The latter indicates a case of positive externalities, in which police next door
help to reduce crime at home. The deterrence effect across borders even overwhelms
that at home, so that police expenditures at home are found insignificantly keeping
crime rates down. With the interaction term added in Column (2.1), police expen-
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ditures of neighbors driving down crime rates at home is confirmed. However, the
spatial interaction term of police expenditures in Column (2.2) again has an negative
sign, which confronts the positive estimate of the spatial-lag term in Column (1.1).
Findings in Table 3.10 are consistent with that in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.4
and Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.7 combined.
Alternatively, to examine the spatial impact of crime rates only, Equations (3.13)
and (3.15) are jointly estimated, i.e.,
lnPit = ρ̃
∑
j
wij lnCjt + φ̃
∑
j
wij lnCjt · lnCit
+θ lnCit + x
T
itβ + ai + ζt + εit, (3.13)
lnCit = π
∑
j
wij lnCjt + ϕ
∑
j
wij lnCjt · lnPit
δ lnPit + y
T
itγ + di + ξt + ηit, (3.15)
with Equation (3.18). Consistent with single-equation results in Column (3) of Table
3.4 and in Column (1) of Table 3.7, crime of neighbors is shown adding more crime
at home, but having little impact on police budget at home in Columns (1.1) and
(1.2) of Table 3.11. With interaction terms included in Columns (2.1) and (2.2),
positive spatial interaction in crime rates is seen once again, while the statistically
insignificant relationship between crime of neighbors and police at home shown in
Column (1.1) becomes not only positive but also substantial. Similar results were
found in Column (4) of Table 3.4 and Column (2) of Table 3.7.
3.5 Conclusion
The relationship between police resources and crime rates is straightforward in
theory, but puzzling in empirics. In the existing literature, less evidence of “more po-
lice, less crime”has been found than that of “more crime, more police”. Endogeneity
is believed to be the challenge, especially in estimating the deterrence effect. This
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chapter makes its first contribution in proposing the fatality rate and the incarceration
rate as the instruments for endogenous police and crime variables, respectively. Using
state-local data from the United States, this chapter succeeds in offering evidence of
both “more police, less crime”and “more crime, more police”.
In addition, applying the GS2SLS and GS3SLS techniques, this chapter reveals
strong spatial autocorrelation in police expenditures as well as in crime rates. Fur-
thermore, it examines the relationship between police resources and crime rates from
a spatial perspective. The results show that higher police expenditures of neighbors
significantly push down crime rates at home, which suggests positive externalities
among neighboring states. On the other hand, crime rates of neighbors seem not
directly taken as a factor to determine the police budget.
As a state benefits from policing of neighbors, but is unwilling to spend more in
return to tackle crime next door, police protection across states may be provided at
a lower level than optimal. A textbook solution to this underprovision problem with
decentralization would be a call for coordination or assistance from a higher level
of government. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, despite of its own jurisdictions
over states, in fact benefits individual states in cracking down on criminal activity
across state borders. Moreover, the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS)
program overseen by Department of Justice was established in 1994 to help states
and local governments hire police offi cers, obtain equipments, and so on.
To explore more policy implications, especially based on a time path of interac-
tions, an impulse-response analysis may be conducted. Marvell and Moody (1994,
1996) have employed reduce-form vector autoregressions and Granger-causality tests
to examine non-spatial interactions between incarceration and crime and between
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police and crime. In future work, a recursive vector autoregression with spatial terms
of police and crime may be performed not only to reveal contemporaneous spatial
estimates, but also to derive impulse-response functions to visualize the dynamics
of spatial interactions between police and crime among average states. In case of
one particular state of a researcher’s interest, this state can be examined with its
average neighbor in a time-series, the original setting for vector autoregressions and
impulse-response functions.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
(48 Contiguous US States, 1989-2008)
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max
Police Expenditures (Thousand Dollars per Capita) 174.164 67.803 46.991 428.562
Income (Thousand Dollars per Capita) 26.727 7.531 12.495 56.272
House Democrats (%) 53.707 15.971 16 100
Democrat Governor (=1) 0.008 0.091 0 1
Fatality Rate (Fatalities per Million Vehicle-Miles) 0.186 0.656 0.067 20.434
Crime Rate (Crimes per Thousand Capita) 43.633 12.450 19.460 88.108
Population Density (Population per Mile2) 277.801 961.854 4.671 10081.230
Age 18-24 (%) 9.984 0.917 7.791 14.464
African Americans (%) 10.430 9.537 0.301 37.617
Bachelor’s + (%) 23.902 5.141 11.100 40.400
Unemployment Rate (%) 5.077 1.352 2.300 11.300
Incarceration Rate (%) 0.346 0.148 0.062 0.865
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Table 3.2: Impacts on Police Expenditures: 2SLS First-Stage Estimates
(1)
ln(Crime Rate) OLS
ln(Incarceration Rate) 0.297***
(0.068)
ln(Income) 0.005
(0.100)
House Democrats -0.0025***
(0.0004)
Democrat Governor 0.046
(0.039)
Constant 4.051***
(0.274)
State Dummies Yes
Year Dummies Yes
Observations 960
Notes: (1) Standard errors in parentheses.
(2) * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
65
Table 3.3: Impacts on Police Expenditures: Single-Equation Non-Spatial Estimates
Equation (3.10)
(1) (2)
ln(Police Expenditure) OLS 2SLS
ln(Crime Rate) 0.205*** 0.556***
(0.023) (0.171)
ln(Income) 0.360*** 0.339***
(0.069) (0.075)
House Democrats -0.0004 0.0006
(0.0003) (0.0006)
Democrat Governor -0.040 -0.055
(0.027) (0.030)
Constant 2.643*** 1.224
(0.211) (0.721)
State Dummies Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes
Observations 960 960
Notes: (1) Standard errors in parentheses. (2)
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 3.4: Impacts on Police Expenditures: Single-Equation Spatial Estimates
Equations (3.11) and (3.12) Equations (3.13) and (3.12)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Police Expenditure) GS2LS GS2SLS GS2LS GS2SLS
Wln(Police Expenditure) (WP) 0.651** 1.777***
(0.225) (0.319)
WP×C -0.146***
(0.030)
Wln(Crime Rate) (WC) 0.223 -0.176
(0.124) (0.153)
WC×C 0.176***
(0.041)
ln(Crime Rate) (C) 0.394* 1.106*** 0.429* -0.227
(0.170) (0.222) (0.173) (0.228)
ln(Income) 0.291*** 0.166* 0.347*** 0.277***
(0.073) (0.076) (0.071) (0.072)
House Democrats 0.0005 -0.0001 0.001 0.0005
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.001) (0.0005)
Democrat Governor -0.049 -0.052 -0.050 -0.053
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Constant -0.647 -6.303*** 1.880** 3.868***
(1.234) (1.677) (0.693) (0.826)
W(Error) -0.073 -0.060 -0.112 -0.113
(0.064) (0.061) (0.065) (0.064)
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 960 960 960 960
Notes: (1) Standard errors in parentheses. (2) * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 3.5: Impacts on Crime Rates: 2SLS First-Stage Estimates
(1) (2)
ln(Police Expenditure) OLS OLS
ln(Fatality Rate) 0.001 -0.248***
(0.012) (0.027)
ln(Population Density) 0.022*** 0.017
(0.006) (0.014)
Age 18-24 0.015*** 0.016
(0.004) (0.009)
African Americans -0.010 0.080***
(0.005) (0.012)
Bachelor’s + 0.0003 0.069***
(0.0015) (0.002)
Unemployment Rate -0.006* -0.032***
(0.003) (0.005)
Constant 4.424*** 1.080*
(0.144) (0.311)
State Dummies Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes No
Observations 960 960
Notes: (1) Standard errors in parentheses. (2)
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 3.6: Impacts on Crime Rates: Single-Equation Non-Spatial Estimates
Equation (3.14)
(1) (2) (3)
ln(Crime Rate) OLS 2SLS 2SLS
ln(Police Expenditure) 0.431*** 77.085 -0.442***
(0.045) (1053.736) (0.073)
ln(Population Density) -0.017* -1.678 0.004
(0.008) (22.829) (0.010)
Age 18-24 0.015* -1.122 -0.001
(0.006) (15.629) (0.006)
African Americans 0.001 0.738 0.001
(0.007) (10.142) (0.010)
Bachelor’s + -0.005* -0.031 -0.001
(0.002) (0.369) (0.006)
Unemployment Rate 0.015*** 0.496 0.009*
(0.004) (6.627) (0.004)
Constant 1.980*** -337.006 5.957***
(0.278) (4659.884) (0.225)
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes No
Observations 960 960 960
Notes: (1) Standard errors in parentheses. (2) * p < 0.05,
** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 3.7: Impacts on Crime Rates: Single-Equation Spatial Estimates
Equations (3.15) and (3.16) Equations (3.17) and (3.16)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Crime Rate) GS2SLS GS2SLS GS2SLS GS2SLS
Wln(Police Expenditure) (WP) -0.774*** 2.537***
(0.032) (0.185)
WP×P -0.650***
(0.037)
Wln(Crime Rate) (WC) 1.634*** -0.834**
(0.067) (0.308)
WC×P 0.537***
(0.061)
ln(Police Expenditure) (P) -0.410*** -2.546*** -0.442*** 2.981***
(0.075) (0.250) (0.075) (0.203)
ln(Population Density) 0.000002 -0.001 -0.004 0.002
(0.009260) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
Age 18-24 0.009 0.017* 0.010 0.013*
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
African Americans 0.009 0.035** 0.009 0.034***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009)
Bachelor’s + 0.007 0.014* 0.010 0.007
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Unemployment Rate 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.012**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Constant 1.890*** 5.861*** 6.278*** -2.257***
(0.178) (0.473) (0.143) (0.513)
W(Error) 0.562*** 0.613*** 0.570*** 0.485***
(0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.039)
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies No No No No
Observations 960 960 960 960
Notes: (1) Standard errors in parentheses. (2) * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 3.8: Interactions between Police Expenditures and Crime Rates: Simultaneous-
Equation Non-Spatial Estimates
Equations (3.10) and (3.14)
(1.1) (1.2) (2.1) (2.2)
3SLS 3SLS
ln(Police ln(Crime ln(Police ln(Crime
Expenditure) Rate) Expenditure) Rate)
ln(Police Expenditure) 0.878*** -0.460***
(0.042) (0.071)
ln(Crime Rate) 0.379** 0.510***
(0.152) (0.154)
ln(Income) 0.340*** 0.329***
(0.068) (0.068)
House Democrats 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Democrat Governor -0.054* -0.056*
(0.027) (0.027)
ln(Population Density) -0.035*** -0.004
(0.008) (0.009)
Age 18-24 0.005 -0.003
(0.006) (0.006)
African Americans 0.008 0.007
(0.006) (0.010)
Bachelor’s + -0.005** -0.0001
(0.002) (0.0056)
Unemployment Rate 0.018*** 0.009*
(0.004) (0.004)
Constant 1.928** (Omitted) 1.424* 5.931***
(0.643) (0.648) (0.221)
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes No
Observations 960 960 960 960
Notes: (1) Standard errors in parentheses. (2) * p < 0.05, p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 3.9: Interactions between Police Expenditures and Crime Rates: Simultaneous-
Equation Spatial Estimates (a)
Equations (3.11), (3.15) and (3.18)
(1.1) (1.2) (2.1) (2.2)
GS3SLS GS3SLS
ln(Police ln(Crime ln(Police ln(Crime
Expenditure) Rate) Expenditure) Rate)
Wln(Police Expenditure) (WP) 1.379*** 2.284***
(0.249) (0.323)
WP×C -0.142***
(0.034)
Wln(Crime Rate) (WC) 1.419*** -1.385***
(0.063) (0.295)
WC×P 0.580***
(0.058)
ln(Police Expenditure) (P) -0.358*** -2.642***
(0.074) (0.239)
ln(Crime Rate) (C) 0.611*** 1.168***
(0.172) (0.214)
ln(Income) 0.336*** 0.288***
(0.077) (0.078)
House Democrats 0.001 0.0001
(0.001) (0.0006)
Democrat Governor -0.058* -0.055
(0.029) (0.028)
ln(Population Density) -0.0002 -0.001
(0.0092) (0.009)
Age 18-24 0.005 0.012
(0.008) (0.008)
African Americans 0.010 0.040***
(0.011) (0.011)
Bachelor’s + 0.006 0.014*
(0.006) (0.005)
Unemployment Rate 0.002 0.002
(0.005) (0.005)
Constant -0.004 1.840*** -1.739 7.301***
(0.839) (0.209) (0.920) (0.581)
W(Error) 0.481*** 0.505***
(0.028) (0.030)
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes No Yes No
Observations 960 960 960 960
Notes: (1) Standard errors in parentheses. (2) * p < 0.05, p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 3.10: Interactions between Police Expenditures and Crime Rates:
Simultaneous-Equation Spatial Estimates (b)
Equations (3.11), (3.17), and (3.18)
(1.1) (1.2) (2.1) (2.2)
GS3SLS GS3SLS
ln(Police ln(Crime ln(Police ln(Crime
Expenditure) Rate) Expenditure) Rate)
Wln(Police Expenditure) (WP) 1.320*** -0.708*** 2.085*** 2.197***
(0.244) (0.028) (0.317) (0.131)
WP×C -0.148***
(0.032)
WP×P -0.544***
(0.026)
ln(Police Expenditure) (P) -0.087 2.783***
(0.071) (0.149)
ln(Crime Rate) (C) 0.589*** 1.142***
(0.172) (0.218)
ln(Income) 0.330*** 0.229**
(0.077) (0.077)
House Democrats 0.001 -0.00004
(0.001) (0.00058)
Democrat Governor -0.057* -0.052
(0.029) (0.028)
ln(Population Density) -0.008 -0.002
(0.009) (0.007)
Age 18-24 0.004 0.013*
(0.007) (0.005)
African Americans 0.001 0.022**
(0.010) (0.008)
Bachelor’s + -0.001 -0.006
(0.005) (0.004)
Unemployment Rate 0.012* 0.020***
(0.005) (0.004)
Constant -0.172 5.906*** -4.074** -4.625***
(0.873) (0.157) (1.243) (0.529)
W(Error) 0.444*** 0.271***
(0.029) (0.033)
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes No Yes No
Observations 960 960 960 960
Notes: (1) Standard errors in parentheses. (2) * p < 0.05, p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 3.11: Interactions between Police Expenditures and Crime Rates:
Simultaneous-Equation Spatial Estimates (c)
Equations (3.13), (3.15), and (3.18)
(1.1) (1.2) (2.1) (2.2)
GS3SLS GS3SLS
ln(Police ln(Crime ln(Police ln(Crime
Expenditure) Rate) Expenditure) Rate)
Wln(Crime Rate) (WC) -0.065 1.392*** -0.681** -1.432***
(0.073) (0.063) (0.235) (0.293)
WC×P 0.584***
(0.058)
WC×C 0.179**
(0.064)
ln(Police Expenditure) (P) -0.351*** -2.649***
(0.074) (0.238)
ln(Crime Rate) (C) 0.464** -0.238
(0.173) (0.303)
ln(Income) 0.300*** 0.260**
(0.078) (0.079)
House Democrats 0.0005 0.0003
(0.0006) (0.0006)
Democrat Governor -0.047 -0.046
(0.029) (0.029)
ln(Population Density) -0.0002 -0.001
(0.0092) (0.009)
Age 18-24 0.004 0.012
(0.008) (0.008)
African Americans 0.010 0.040***
(0.011) (0.011)
Bachelor’s + 0.006 0.014*
(0.006) (0.005)
Unemployment Rate 0.002 0.002
(0.005) (0.005)
Constant 4.376*** 1.835*** 5.735*** 7.461***
(0.370) (0.214) (0.582) (0.592)
W(Error) 0.469*** 0.493***
(0.029) (0.030)
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes No Yes No
Observations 960 960 960 960
Notes: (1) Standard errors in parentheses. (2) * p < 0.05, p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Chapter 4 The Leviathan Hypothesis, Cost Effi ciency, and Spatial
Interactions among Governments
4.1 Introduction
The general public, politicians, and economists as well have mixed opinions about
the consequences of fiscal competition. On the one hand, it is concerned that tax
reduction to attract investment, for example, may be escalated to a “race to the bot-
tom”, leaving competing governments shorthanded on providing indispensable goods
or services to their residents. On the other hand, it is often believed that decentral-
ization and resulting competition rein in wastefulness in government spending and
growth of the public sector. The latter argument is also known as the Leviathan
hypothesis among economists and other researchers.
Fiscal competition may bring about reduction in taxes and probably in the quan-
tity of goods and services publicly provided as well. It is not impossible, however, that
intergovernmental competition improves the quality of public provision, even though
expenditures reduce, and thus increases the welfare of residents across jurisdictions.
The Leviathan hypothesis is all about this possibility, via which the public sector, the
same as the private sector, is more cost effi cient due to competition. In many previous
studies, the Leviathan hypothesis is interpreted and tested as the inverse relationship
between government size and fiscal decentralization. Government size reflects the
costs of running the public sector, but not necessarily the wastefulness involved with
government. To take the Leviathan hypothesis more seriously, a researcher should
employ empirical models that capture the idea of cost effi ciency in public provision.
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Another problem with the previous tests for the Leviathan hypothesis is that
fiscal decentralization is measured only within a jurisdiction. For example, in some
studies on taxes or expenditures aggregated to the state level, the number of local
jurisdictions is taken to measure the degree of decentralization. Interaction among
states, another aspect of decentralization, is overlooked. To fully understand the
impact of fiscal decentralization on either government size or government effi ciency,
a researcher should also bring in a spatial perspective on the Leviathan hypothesis.
This chapter answers the need for effi ciency considerations and spatial perspec-
tives in testing the Leviathan hypothesis. More specifically, it includes measures for
intergovernmental competition both within a jurisdiction and among jurisdictions in
testing their impacts on both government size and cost effi ciency. Supplementary to
the existing studies on total expenditures, this chapter examines multiple spending
categories of US state and local governments, including elementary and primary edu-
cation, police protection, highways, and public welfare. Some findings in this chapter
confirm the Leviathan hypothesis.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the
literatures related to the Leviathan hypothesis. It is followed by data description in
Section 4.3. Sections 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7 present the empirical models and results
based on the original approach, a stochastic frontier setup, a spatial component, and a
comprehensive stochastic frontier and spatial analysis in turn. Section 4.8 concludes.
4.2 Literature Review
In a prevailing view of fiscal federalism, intergovernmental competition for mobile
resources is ineffi cient. To attract capital, for example, to flow into a jurisdiction,
76
the government would have to lower tax rates on investment. As each government
pursues the same strategy, taxes across jurisdictions are driven too low in a Nash
equilibrium to finance indispensable public goods and services (Wilson, 1986; Zodrow
and Mieszkowski, 1986). In this theory, each government is assumed benevolent,
maximizing the total utility of all the residents within its jurisdiction.
Alternatively, Brennan and Buchanan (1980) characterize government, analogous
to typical monopoly, as a revenue-maximizing monster. They predict that “Total
government intrusion into the economy should be smaller, ceteris paribus, the greater
the extent to which taxes and expenditures are decentralized (p. 185).”The inverse
relationship between government size and fiscal decentralization is also known as the
Leviathan hypothesis. In contrast to the prevailing view, the Leviathan hypothesis
suggests that fiscal competition helps to cut off excess revenues and wasteful expendi-
tures, and thus improve accountability in government (Rauscher, 1998; Wilson, 2005;
Besley and Smart, 2007)1.
Since Oates (1985), economists have been vigorously searching for the footprints
of Leviathan, and various approaches have been taken to measuring the size of gov-
ernment and the degree of decentralization. While quantifying government size by
state-local taxes as a fraction of personal income, Oates (1985) uses three measures
of fiscal decentralization, namely, the state share of state-local general revenues, the
state share of state-local total expenditures, and the number of local jurisdictions.
1Edwards and Keen (1996) made the first attempt to bring together these two distinct per-
spectives. They demonstrate that tax competition is preferred to tax coordination, if the marginal
propensity to finance unproductive public expenditures exceeds the marginal excess burden of taxa-
tion. Taking a theoretical model to Swiss data, Brülhart and Jametti (2008) show that government
fragmentation has a positive relationship with tax rates in direct democratic municipalities, but
is found negatively correlated with tax rates in delegated municipalities. While the former case is
consistent with the benevolence hypothesis, the latter alludes to revenue-maximizing behavior under
the Leviathan hypothesis.
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Controlling for personal income per capita, population size, the extent of urbaniza-
tion, intergovernmental grants, He finds that the predicted inverse relationship is not
statistically significant in either case. Besides the tax measure of government size,
Nelson (1987) uses government expenditures as a fraction of personal income. Also,
he differentiates the general-purpose from the single-function in counting the number
of local jurisdictions. More general-purpose local jurisdictions are found contributing
to a smaller public sector, which supports the Leviathan hypothesis. It is, however,
not the case for single-function local jurisdictions. Zax (1989) refers to the share of
own-source local revenues as the measure of “centralism”and to the number of local
jurisdictions as the measure of “fragmentation”. His empirical results show that local
public sectors with a higher degree of centralism or a lower degree of fragmentation
tend to be larger. In the following research, Marlow (1988) and Grossman (1989), for
example, turn to the growth of expenditures aggregated to the highest level of gov-
ernment for investigation. Ehdaie (1994) then examines decentralization of revenues
and expenditures combined, and provides further empirical support.
One criticism of the Leviathan hypothesis is that the inverse relationship be-
tween government size and fiscal decentralization could be due to interjurisdictional
competition among benevolent governments that maximize the welfare of their own
residents. If, for example, there are benefit spillovers of publicly provided goods or
services, each government involved tends to invest less with its money but free-ride
on its neighboring jurisdictions (Sandier, 1975; Sandier and Cauley, 1976). There has
been evidence that central cities in the United States contribute to higher property
value in surrounding suburbs (Haughwout, 1999), and suburbs in Spain largely ben-
efit from local facilities in urban municipalities (Solé-Ollé, 2006). In addition, Oates
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(1985) mentions a point on welfare migration made by Richard A. Musgrave. That is,
to maintain a favorable tax base, governments across jurisdictions tend to cut down
the budget of welfare programs to deter the poor but to attract the wealthy. The
concern over fiscal decentralization and underprovided welfare benefits (Brown and
Oates, 1987) is supported by empirical evidence from US state governments (Figlio
et al., 1999; Saavedra, 2000; Wheaton, 2000). Last, to signal better governance ca-
pability and win the support from voters with asymmetric information, government
offi cials tend to cut down taxes, for example, especially when neighboring govern-
ments are doing so (Besley and Smart, 2007). In empirical findings, jurisdictional
governments are found engaged in the so-called “yardstick competition”and exhibit
mimicking behavior in setting tax rates (Besley and Case, 1995; Bordignon et al.,
2003; Allers and Elhorst, 2005; Bosch and Solé-Ollé, 2007).
Under the Leviathan hypothesis, intergovernmental competition helps to cut off
excess revenues and wasteful expenditures, and thus promotes accountability in gov-
ernment. It then seems more relevant to define this hypothesis as the direct rela-
tionship between government effi ciency and fiscal decentralization. The concept of
government effi ciency not only comprises government size as an evaluation compo-
nent, but also incorporates the information about to what extent the given tax money
is effi ciently used to provide goods and services. In a large body of empirical litera-
ture, various stochastic frontier models have been employed to examine technical/cost
effi ciency of government, the extent to which production/cost in the public sector is
below/above the maximum/minimum possible, given the inputs/outputs. Educa-
tion is probably the most explored government expenditure category. For example,
Kang and Greene (2002) look into the impact of public and private competition
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on technical effi ciency among high schools in the state of New York. Abbott and
Doucouliagos (2009) are interested in whether competition for international students
enhances technical effi ciency in universities in Australia and New Zealand. Dodson
and Garrett (2004) investigate whether consolidating school districts improves cost
effi ciency in Arkansas. While Robst (2001) examines multiple issues with cost effi -
ciency in American public universities, Izadi et al. (2002) estimate a more complex
constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) cost function for British higher-education
institutions.
As the first extension to the literature, this chapter plans to test the Leviathan
hypothesis by stochastic cost frontier models for multiple government expenditure
categories. The second extension has to do with spatial interactions among gov-
ernment, of which tax competition, benefit/cost spillovers, welfare migration, and
yardstick competition are particular cases. With the previous findings of positive
spatial autocorrelation in state government expenditures (Case et al., 1993; Baicker,
2005), this chapter is to investigate whether government size is spatially correlated,
with the control for the number of local jurisdictions.
Geys (2006) brings together techniques in stochastic frontier and spatial analy-
sis to spatial interaction in effi ciency enhancement in government provision among
the Flemish municipalities in Belgium. He first estimates a stochastic cost frontier,
taking total current government expenditures as the costs of producing four mea-
sures of goods and services – namely, the number of subsistence grant beneficiaries,
the number of students in local primary schools, the surface of public recreational
facilities, and the length of municipal roads. Then, by transforming ineffi ciency esti-
mates, an effi ciency measure is obtained. In his second step specifying the effi ciency
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determinants, Geys (2006) introduces a spatially weighted effi ciency term to exam-
ine the impact of municipal competition on effi ciency enhancement. With different
specifications and estimation methods, his statistically significant estimates of the
spatial-lag parameter vary roughly between 0.2 and 0.7. The similar spatial pattern
of government effi ciency is detected by Revelli and Tovmo (2007) too. Taking a sim-
ilar strategy as Geys (2006), this chapter plans to test the Leviathan hypothesis by
examining the relationship between government effi ciency and fiscal decentralization.
As Schmidt and Sickles (1984) point out, panel data in stochastic frontier analy-
sis help to gain consistency of the estimates, relax the distributional assumptions
on ineffi ciency, and ease the concerns over the correlation between ineffi ciency and
other dependent variables. Extending Geys (2006)’s cross-section analysis, this chap-
ter uses panel data and takes fixed effects into account in estimating time-varying
(in)effi ciency. Moreover, alternative to Geys (2006), a cost frontier is estimated with
environmental factors under certain model specifications. Last, when it comes to
spatial analysis, both spatial lags and errors are taken care of.
4.3 Data Description
The data are from the 48 continental US states from 1991 to 2008. Summary
statistics for each variable are listed in Table 4.1.
This chapter considers total expenditures as well as expenditures on elementary
and secondary education, police protection, highways, and public welfare. All spend-
ing categories are examined at the aggregate state-local level. Since education and
police are primarily a local function, the government expenditures on them are also
examined at the local level with total expenditures.
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Oates (1985), Nelson (1987), and Zax (1989) all take the number of local juris-
dictions in a state to measure the degree of fiscal decentralization in a cross-section
setting. As there is little yearly variation in this variable, the numbers of counties
or their equivalents2 and of school districts as of 2007 are used for all the years. A
limitation of this treatment is that state fixed effects are no longer identifiable, which
could in turn affect the accuracy of available estimates. The Leviathan hypothesis
suggests that, due to greater competition, more local governments lead to smaller
government size and higher cost effi ciency. The same prediction, however, may be
generated under diseconomies of scale. To identify one effect from another, more
careful examination is needed.
In line with Oates (1985), Nelson (1987), and Zax (1989), total intergovernmental
revenues will be divided by general revenues to obtain the percentage of intergov-
ernmental grants corresponding to total expenditures. Since the amount of revenues
for individual government functions is not reported, the share of intergovernmental
expenditures for each government function will be computed instead. The grant share
may be taken as another measure for fiscal decentralization. Grants sometimes raise
the concern over reduced incentives. To interpret a positive coeffi cient estimate as
evidence in support of the Leviathan hypothesis, one needs to have the flypaper ef-
fect addressed. When it comes to stochastic frontier analysis, a negative coeffi cient
estimate of the transfer share is consistent with the Leviathan hypothesis. A positive
sign then suggests that intergovernmental grants increase effi ciency by internalizing
externalities, for example.
Other independent variables include personal income per capita, population den-
2For Connecticut and Rhode Island, where there are no organized county governments, the
number of their subcounties is used for approximation.
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sity, the percentage of Democrats in the House, and a dummy for Democratic gov-
ernor. Suppose that personal income is found to be positively correlated with gov-
ernment size. Rather than being wasteful, more government expenditures may be
used to provide public goods and services with higher quality. This possibility can be
taken into account in stochastic analysis by having an measure for quality outputs.
Six output measures of publicly provided goods and services are used to estimate
stochastic cost frontiers, with government expenditures being the cost measure. The
total enrollment of public elementary and secondary schools and the averaged fresh-
man graduation rate (AFGR) for public high schools are used to measure the scale
and quality of public elementary and secondary education. As an estimate of the per-
centage of an entering freshman class obtaining the high school diploma, the AFGR
is calculated by dividing the total number of diploma recipients in an school-year end
by the average enrollment of the 10th-grade class two years ago, the 9th-grade class
three years ago, and the 8th-grade class four years ago. The annual vehicle-mileage
of travel and the total number of registered drivers reflect of the role of government
in transportation. If clear-up crime rates were recorded, they may be taken as an
output measure for police protection. Unfortunately, only crime rates are available.
For this reason, the current chapter does not include police protection expenditures.
The distribution function of government are captured by total number of Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), or previously Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) recipients and by total number of Supplemental Security Income
(SSI) recipients. The TANF/AFDC and SSI are federal assistance programs with
large involvement of state governments. State governments usually provide addi-
tional funds and services to those recipients who are in poverty, in disability, or in
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some other hardships. The corresponding cost measures to the six output measures
are elementary and secondary education expenditures, highway expenditures, and
public welfare expenditures, respectively.
The statistics on government finances, government structure, population, and
land area are accessible at the Bureau of the Census. The Bureau of Economic
Analysis is responsible for reporting personal income. The information on the party
affi liation of state legislators and governors is kept track of at the Council of State
Governments. The enrollment data for public schools are from the National Center
for Education Statistics. The data on vehicle-mileage of travel and driver registration
are made available by National Highway Traffi c Safety Administration. The numbers
of TANF/AFDC recipients and SSI recipients are reported at the Department of
Health and Human Services and the Social Security Administration, respectively.
4.4 Government Size and Fiscal Decentralization: The Original Approach
4.4.1 Model Specification
In line with Oates (1985) and Nelson (1987), the share of government expen-
ditures in personal income is taken to measure government size in this chapter.
Since this measure is bounded between 0 and 1, the logit transformation, i.e., logit
(y) = ln
(
y
1−y
)
, where y is the variable to be transformed, is applied to generate a de-
pendent variable with a possible range of all real numbers. Alternatively, government
expenditures per capita in natural logarithmic form may be used as the dependent
variable, which is an exercise left to future work.
Both Oates (1985) and Nelson (1987) consider state-local total expenditures. Nel-
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son (1987) also looks into fire protection expenditures, a local spending category, in
particular. In this chapter, local total expenditures aggregated to the state level are
examined first, and then aggregate state-local total expenditures. The same proce-
dure applies to expenditures on elementary and secondary education and on police
protection expenditures as well, two essentially local spending categories. As state
governments rein expenditures on highways and on public welfare, these two spending
categories are examined only at the aggregate state-local level.
Oates (1985), Nelson (1987), and Zax (1989) all use cross-section data of a par-
ticular year in conducting their tests. Extensions are made in this section to panel
data. Since the data on the number of counties or of school districts per capita are
based on a single year, state fixed effects cannot be either identified or removed. In
this case, only year fixed dummies are specified, whenever they are jointly significant.
The share of intergovernmental transfers in local or state-local finances is taken as a
control variable in all the three studies, in which the predicted positive relationship
between government size and intergovernmental grants are assumed due to the mys-
terious flypaper effect3. However, more intergovernmental grants from a higher-level
government, for better or worse, is also an indication of greater dependence and less
decentralization, and thus is hypothesized to cause larger government size. Perhaps
intergovernmental grants should be paid more attention to as a measure for fiscal
decentralization.
Besides personal income per capita, Oates (1985) and Nelson (1987) include the
percentage of urban population as a control variable. As the latter index is not
reported annually, population density is computed instead. To control for political
3Hines and Thaler (1995) reviews the evidence of the so-called “flypaper effect”, a term coined
by Arthur M. Okun to metaphorize the prediction that grants stimulate local spending.
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environment in a state, the percentage of Democrats in the House and a dummy for
Democratic governor are added to the list of independent variables.
4.4.2 Estimation Results
Total government expenditures are examined first at the local level, and then at
the aggregate state-local level. The estimation results are presented in Table 4.2. In
Column (1) are the baseline results without the number of counties. While drop-
ping state dummies, Column (2) includes the number of counties as a measure for
fiscal decentralization. Year dummies of joint statistical significance are included in
both specifications. The number of counties in Column (2) is seen negatively and
significantly correlated with government size. This significant inverse relationship
that supports the Leviathan hypothesis holds for total government expenditures at
the state-local level as well. In Column (4), despite that the coeffi cient estimate of
the number of counties reduces, the marginal impact on government size remains
strong. The share of intergovernmental revenues is insignificant at the local level, but
significant and positive at the aggregate state and local level. Grants may correct
for positive externalities and the resulting underprovision problem. Grants may also
reduce incentives at the local level to maintain a hard budget constraint. Without
further information, the nature of increased expenditures by grants is unclear. Per-
sonal income per capita is significantly but negatively correlated with the expenditure
share in each column.
Both Nelson (1987) and Zax (1989) make the distinction between general-purpose
and single-function government units. When it comes to elementary and secondary
education, the number of public school districts is used. This spending category is
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examined at both local and state-local levels too. The coeffi cient estimates of our
main interest in Table 4.3 are positive, statistically significant, and almost identical.
The positive sign does not support the Leviathan prediction, but may indicate disec-
onomies of scale in public education. In principle, to single out the impact of fiscal
decentralization on government size, either a measure for (dis)economies of scale needs
to be included, or a better measure for intergovernmental competition is expected.
The sign and significance level of the intergovernmental expenditure share vary with
or without the number of school districts. Personal income per capita remains its
negative relationship with the expenditure share at certain significance levels.
Police protection is another spending category mainly at the local level. Nelson
(1987) considers fire protection expenditures, and finds supporting evidence. Com-
paring Column (2) with Column (4) of Table 4.4, the inverse relationship between
the share of police expenditures and the number of counties is stronger when this
category is examined at the local level than at the aggregate state-local level. Note
that, since year dummies are not jointly statistically significant when the number of
counties is present, they are thus excluded with state dummies. With the number
of counties included, the expenditure share is found to have a significant but nega-
tive relationship with intergovernmental grants. Meanwhile, the expenditure share is
larger if personal income per capita is higher.
Since highway and public welfare are two spending categories mainly at the state
level, they are examined at the state-local level only. Shown in Table 4.5 and Table
4.6, respectively, government size and the number of counties are positively correlated.
This positive relationship is stronger for highway expenditures than for welfare expen-
ditures. While the results on intergovernmental grants are mixed, the negative impact
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of personal income on the expenditure share is robust to data and specifications.
4.5 Government Effi ciency and Fiscal Decentralization: Stochastic Fron-
tier Estimation
4.5.1 Model Specification
To capture the idea that fiscal decentralization reduces wasteful expenditures,
the Leviathan hypothesis is redefined as the direct relationship between government
effi ciency and fiscal decentralization. Stochastic frontier models suit well the present
research purpose. With government expenditures being the costs for publicly provided
goods and services, a stochastic cost frontier in a cross-section setting may take a
transcendental logarithmic (translog) form as
ln ci = α +
∑
p
βp ln yi, p +
1
2
∑
p
∑
q
γpq ln yi, p ln yi, q + vi + ui, (4.1)
where ci denotes the costs to the ith government, y with a subscript p or q represents
the pth or qth good or service publicly provided, vi is an error term assumed inde-
pendent and identically normally distributed with a zero mean, i.e., vi ∼ N (0, σ2v),
uit is the ineffi ciency term that adds more costs, and α, β’s, and γ’s are unknown
parameters. By imposing γpq = 0, a Cobb—Douglas cost function may be formed as
a special case.
Different distributional assumptions on the ineffi ciency lead to a variety of sto-
chastic frontier models. In this chapter, uit is assumed either half-normal, i.e.,
ui ∼ N (0, σ2u)
+, or truncated-normal, i.e., ui ∼ N (µu, σ2u)
+, where µu and σu stand
for the mean and the standard deviation, respectively. Given the distributional as-
sumptions on vi and ui, a stochastic cost frontier may be estimated by maximum
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likelihood (ML) without considering effi ciency determinants at this stage. The esti-
mator of cost effi ciency E {exp [ui| (vi + ui)]} is interpreted as the archived percentage
of cost effi ciency. Mathematically, it is written as
E {exp [ui| (vi + ui)]} =
1− Φ
(
−µi+σ
2
σ
)
1− Φ
(
−µi
σ
)
 exp(µi + σ22
)
,
σ =
σvσu√
σ2v + σ
2
u
,
µi =
(vi + ui)σ
2
u
σ2v + σ
2
u
, if ui ∼ N
(
0, σ2u
)+
,
µi =
(vi + ui)σ
2
u + µuσ
2
v
σ2v + σ
2
u
, if ui ∼ N
(
µu, σ
2
u
)+
,
where Φ (·) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribu-
tion. With obtained effi ciency estimates from Equation (4.1), the impacts of various
environmental factors on effi ciency achievement can be evaluated in a multivariate
regression.
The approach of estimating a stochastic frontier and evaluating its effi ciency de-
terminants separately assumes independence. However, as Wang and Schmidt (2002,
p. 130) put it, “the position of the frontier may depend on things other than those
typically thought of as inputs, and the inputs may be among the factors that also
affect technical effi ciency”. Among many others, Wang and Schmidt (2002) argue
that first-step estimates are biased downward, if frontier and effi ciency determinants
are correlated. Moreover, second-step estimates are biased toward zero, even though
frontier determinants are independent of effi ciency determinants in the first step.
These claims are supported by their simulation results.
Two alternative one-step strategies have been taken to simultaneously estimate
the two steps. Kumbhakar et al. (1991), Huang and Liu (1994), and Battese and
Coelli (1995), for example, parameterize the non-zero mean of the truncated normally
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distributed ineffi ciency term, i.e., ui ∼ N
(
xTi δ, σ
2
u
)+
. In contrast, Reifschneider and
Stevenson (1991), Caudill and Ford (1993), and Caudill. et al. (1995), for example,
parameterize the variance of the half-normal distribution for the ineffi ciency term,
i.e., ui ∼ N
[
0, exp
(
xTi δ
)
· σ2u
]+
. The effi ciency measure is accordingly modified by
replacing µu with x
T
i δ in the former case, and by replacing σ
2
u with exp
(
xTi δ
)
· σ2u in
the latter case, respectively.
The rest of this subsection is devoted to accommodating fixed effects for panel
data analysis implementing the above approaches. Fixed effects may either go into
the cost function, the mean of the ineffi ciency term, or the variance of the ineffi ciency
term. In each case, the ineffi ciency term may or may not be specified as a function
of environmental factors.
In the case of fixed effects in the cost function, Equation (4.1) is modified such
that
ln cit = α +
∑
p
βp ln yit, p +
1
2
∑
p
∑
q
γpq ln yit, p ln yit, q + ϕi + ς t + vit + uit, (4.2)
where t indexes time periods, ϕi and ς t control for two-way fixed effects with ϕi
being a state dummy for individual effects and ς t being a year dummy for time
effects. The distribution of the ineffi ciency term may be assumed half-normal, i.e.,
uit ∼ N (0, σ2u)
+, or truncated-normal, uit ∼ N (µu, σ2u)
+, without heterogeneity in
either the mean or variance. Alternatively, one may choose to parameterize the
variance of the half-normal ineffi ciency term, i.e., uit ∼ N
[
0, exp
(
xTitδ
)
· σ2u
]+
, or
the mean of the truncated-normal ineffi ciency term, i.e., uit ∼ N
(
xTitδ, σ
2
u
)+
, with
environmental factors. To summarize, given fixed effects in the cost function, the
scenarios of whether the ineffi ciency term is assumed of a half-normal or truncated-
normal distribution and whether heterogeneity is introduced to the ineffi ciency term
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by environmental factors, lead to four models labeled (1a), (1b), (2a), and (2b), i.e.,
Model (1a):

ln cit = α +
∑
p
βp ln yit, p +
1
2
∑
p
∑
q
γpq ln yit, p ln yit, q
+ϕi + ς t + vit + uit,
uit ∼ N [0, σ2u]
+ ;
Model (1b):

ln cit = α +
∑
p
βp ln yit, p +
1
2
∑
p
∑
q
γpq ln yit, p ln yit, q
+ϕi + ς t + vit + uit,
uit ∼ N
[
0, exp
(
xTitδ
)
· σ2u
]+
;
Model (2a):

ln cit = α +
∑
p
βp ln yit, p +
1
2
∑
p
∑
q
γpq ln yit, p ln yit, q
+ϕi + ς t + vit + uit,
uit ∼ N [µu, σ2u]
+ ;
Model (2b):

ln cit = α +
∑
p
βp ln yit, p +
1
2
∑
p
∑
q
γpq ln yit, p ln yit, q
+ϕi + ς t + vit + uit,
uit ∼ N
[
xTitδ, σ
2
u
]+
;
As fixed effects are placed in the mean of the ineffi ciency term, Equation (4.2)
reduces to
ln cit = α +
∑
p
βp ln yit, p +
1
2
∑
p
∑
q
γpq ln yit, p ln yit, q + vit + uit, (4.3)
where uit ∼ N [(ϕi + ς t) , σ2u]
+, if no environmental factors are specified, and uit ∼
N
[(
xTitδ + ϕi + ς t
)
, σ2u
]+
, if environmental factors are considered. The models ac-
commodate these two placements of fixed effects in the mean of uit are labeled Models
(3a) and (3b), i.e.,
Model (3a):

ln cit = α +
∑
p
βp ln yit, p +
1
2
∑
p
∑
q
γpq ln yit, p ln yit, q
+vit + uit,
uit ∼ N [(ϕi + ς t) , σ2u]
+ ;
Model (3b):

ln cit = α +
∑
p
βp ln yit, p +
1
2
∑
p
∑
q
γpq ln yit, p ln yit, q
+vit + uit,
uit ∼ N
[(
xTitδ + ϕi + ς t
)
, σ2u
]+
;
91
A model allowing for variation in both the mean and variance of the ineffi ciency
term cannot be empirically identified. To bring fixed effects into its variance, the
ineffi ciency term turns back to the distribution assumption of half-normality. De-
pending on whether environmental factors are included, the exact distribution of
the ineffi ciency term can be written as uit ∼ N [0, exp (ϕi + ς t) · σ2u]
+, or as uit ∼
N
[
0, exp
(
xTitδ + ϕi + ς t
)
· σ2u
]+
. As before, if environmental factors are not consid-
ered in estimating the cost frontier, they are then used in the following analysis on
effi ciency determination, and vice versa. Resulting Models (4.a) and (4.b) resemble
Models (3a) and (3b), except for the distribution assumption on the ineffi ciency term,
i.e.,
Model (4a):

ln cit = α +
∑
p
βp ln yit, p +
1
2
∑
p
∑
q
γpq ln yit, p ln yit, q
+vit + uit,
uit ∼ N [0, exp (ϕi + ς t) · σ2u]
+ ;
Model (4b):

ln cit = α +
∑
p
βp ln yit, p +
1
2
∑
p
∑
q
γpq ln yit, p ln yit, q
+vit + uit,
uit ∼ N
[
0, exp
(
xTitδ + ϕi + ς t
)
· σ2u
]+
;
Below is a list of the eight models introduced in this section. As there is little
theoretical guidance in the literature on model selection, which of the eight models
actually works will be found out through experimentation.
Model (1a): Fixed effects in the cost function, half-normal uit, without environ-
mental factors in frontier estimation.
Model (1b): Fixed effects in the cost function, half-normal uit, with environmen-
tal factors in frontier estimation.
Model (2a): Fixed effects in the cost function, truncated-normal uit, without
environmental factors in frontier estimation.
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Model (2b): Fixed effects in the cost function, truncated-normal uit, with envi-
ronmental factors in frontier estimation.
Model (3a): Fixed effects in the mean of uit, truncated-normal uit, without
environmental factors in frontier estimation.
Model (3b): Fixed effects in the mean of uit, truncated-normal uit, with envi-
ronmental factors in frontier estimation.
Model (4a): Fixed effects in the variance of uit, half-normal uit, without envi-
ronmental factors in frontier estimation.
Model (4b): Fixed effects in the variance of uit, half-normal uit, with environ-
mental factors in frontier estimation.
4.5.2 Estimation Results
It turns out that education data do not fit any model, highway data fit Models
(1a), (1b), (2b), and (3b), and welfare data fit Models (1a) and (2b). Short of data on
appropriate output measures such as clearance rates, this analysis is not feasible for
police protection. For the same reason, total expenditures are not considered either4.
State dummies are replaced to accommodate the number of local jurisdictions, when-
ever it is appropriate. However, no specification with this decentralization measure
ends up with success in one-step stochastic cost frontier estimation. The two-step
approach is then largely relied on to produce comparable results to Oates (1985),
Nelson (1987), and Zax (1989).
The estimation results for state-local highway expenditures are shown in Table
4.7. The upper half of Columns (1) and (2) are identical, which gives Model (1a)
4Total expenditures on police protection, highways, and public welfare were attempted. Same
as what happened with education data, all the models fail to converge in stochastic cost frontier
estimation.
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estimates with both state and year fixed dummies jointly statistically significant in
the cost function. The estimated cost function takes a Cobb-Douglas form without
translog terms, since the latter is not jointly statistically significant. The estimated
σvit and σuit are 0.067 and 0.133, respectively, in Model (1a), suggesting less variation
on the frontier across states, but more variation in costs above the frontier, i.e.,
ineffi ciency. The p-value associated with the likelihood-ratio test is less than 0.001,
which provides solid evidence of the existence of the ineffi ciency component uit.
With a mean of 1.114 and a standard deviation of 0.079, the effi ciency estimates
vary from 1.012 to 1.803, which is outside the theoretically possible range of [0, 1].
This is less concerned here, because this chapter does not rely on interpreting these
estimates but uses them for comparison across jurisdictions. The kernel density of
the effi ciency estimates are shown in the upper-left panel of Figure 4.1. As expected,
the density curve is skewed to the right.
In Column (1) of Table 4.8, the 48 continental states are ranked based on the 18-
year annual average effi ciency scores. Massachusetts, New Mexico, and Georgia are
in lead, while Nebraska, Michigan, and Ohio are left behind. The spatial distribution
of this ranking is labeled in the first map in Figure 4.2. Although not shown on the
map, the state names corresponding to this ranking can be found in Table 4.8.
Now, let us go back to Table 4.7. The lower half of Columns (1) and (2) are the
second-step estimates of effi ciency determinants. Year dummies are dropped due to
joint statistical insignificance. Not in favor of the Leviathan hypothesis, the number of
counties does not have a significant inverse relationship with cost effi ciency. However,
intergovernmental grants are seen negatively affecting cost effi ciency.
Column (3) of Table 4.7 gives the one-step Model (1b) estimates for highway ex-
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penditures, in which estimation of effi ciency scores and evaluation of environmental
factors are conducted simultaneously. Despite that the number of counties is unable
to fit into these stochastic cost frontier models, the significant negative impact of
intergovernmental grants on cost effi ciency is quite interesting, especially if it is in-
terpreted as an indicator of fiscal intervention from a higher level of government, or
simply of fiscal centralization. The effi ciency estimates are bounded between 1.014
and 2.127, with a mean of 1.110 and a standard deviation of 0.104, whose kernel
density is estimated and visualized in the upper-right panel of Figure 4.1. According
to Column (2) of Table 4.8, Massachusetts, Georgia, and New Mexico remain the
top three in cost effi ciency in highway expenditures, despite of the position switch
between the latter two states. Michigan now is joined by Arizona and Oregon among
the bottom three. The second map in Figure 4.2 illustrates the spatial distribution
of the Model (1b) annual average effi ciency scores by state.
Highway data also fit Model (2b). The impact of intergovernmental grants on cost
effi ciency remains negative, but no longer statistically significant, as seen in Column
(4) of Table 4.7. The effi ciency estimates lie between 1.012 and 2.186, with a mean of
1.106 and a standard deviation of 0.112. The kernel density function in the lower-left
panel of Figure 4.1 exhibits a similar shape to the previous estimates. In Column (3)
of Table 4.8, Massachusetts, Georgia, and New Mexico hold their exact positions as
in Column (2). Meanwhile, Nebraska, Ohio, and Michigan are rated the least cost
effi cient states in highway expenditures this time. This ranking is put on the third
map in Figure 4.2 to demonstrate how effi ciency score are geographically distributed.
The estimated results of the last stochastic cost frontier model using highway
expenditures are offered in Column (5) of Table 4.7. Although the translog terms
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are jointly statistically insignificant, dropping them leads to a failure of convergence.
These translog terms are thus kept as a compromise. The evidence of intergovern-
mental grants undermining cost effi ciency is confirmed once again. The effi ciency
estimates, however, fall into a much wider range of [1.014, 10.098]. The mean effi -
ciency score is 3.332, while the standard deviation is 1.417. Seen in the lower-right
panel of Figure 4.1, the kernel density function takes a much longer tail there than in
other panels. Models (3b) estimates also shuffl e the ranking in Column (4) of Table
4.8 as well as on the last map in Figure 4.2. That is, Wyoming, South Dakota, and
North Dakota stand out above the rest, while Michigan, Texas, and California meet
each other at the bottom of the list.
Now, we switch to state-local public welfare expenditures. Columns (1) and (2) of
Table 4.9 present the Model (1a) results. Their upper half is based on the first-step
estimation of effi ciency scores. With the fact of the estimated σvit and σuit being
0.095 and 0.045, respectively, the likelihood-ratio test for a non-zero ineffi ciency term
is not passed. Using the effi ciency scores with a minimum of 1.010, a maximum of
1.136, a mean of 1.037, and a standard deviation of 0.008, the kernel density function
is nevertheless plotted in the upper panel of Figure 4.3. Using the 18-year annual
average, cost effi ciency by state is ranked in Column (1) of Table 4.8 and labeled
on the first map of Figure 4.4. While New Hampshire, Oklahoma, and New Mexico
exhibit the most cost effi ciency in welfare expenditures, Iowa, Idaho, and Arkansas
fall into the bottom three. The second-step evaluation of effi ciency determinants
is nevertheless carried out as well. Year dummies are dropped, because of joint
statistical insignificance. As found by same model using highway expenditures, the
number of counties is not seen having a significant positive impact on cost effi ciency,
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so that the Leviathan hypothesis is not supported.
With environmental factors except the number of counties, welfare data also fit
Model (2b). As before, more intergovernmental grants do not seem to promote cost
effi ciency. The minimum and maximum of the effi ciency estimates are 1.013 and
1.941, respectively, with a mean of 1.450 and a standard deviation of 0.148. The
kernel density function estimated is not seen right-skewed in the lower panel of Figure
4.3. Based on the annual average effi ciency scores, Idaho, Wyoming, and Utah are
the most effi cient users of welfare expenditures. The bottom three go to Colorado,
New York, and California. The effi ciency ranking is also represented on the second
map of Figure 4.4.
In both highway and welfare data, intergovernmental grants are negatively cor-
related with cost effi ciency. This suggests that intergovernmental grants may have
an incentive effect that causes lower-level governments to care less about cost sav-
ing. Personal income per capita in general does not have substantial impacts on cost
effi ciency.
4.6 Government Size and Fiscal Decentralization: A Spatial Perspective
4.6.1 Model Specification
In the literature thus far, fiscal decentralization has had its measures for sub-
jurisdictions within a jurisdiction, e.g., the number of counties in a state. What
has been missing in testing the Leviathan hypothesis is a measure for fiscal relations
across states, in addition to a measure for decentralized counties within each state.
To investigate whether government size in a state is affected by government size in
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neighboring states, a regression function is set up as
Eit = ρ
∑
j
wijEjt + x
T
itδ+ψi + τ t + εit, (4.4)
with
εit = λ
∑
j
wijεjt + ηit, (4.5)
whereEit denotes the logit of the share of government expenditures in personal income
per capita in the ith state in the tth year, wij is an element of a spatial-weight matrix
determining the relative influence of the jth state on the ith, xit is a vector of control
variables including a measure for fiscal decentralization within a state, ψi is a state
dummy and τ t is a year dummy, εi and ηi are error terms assumed standard normally
distributed, and ρ, δ, and λ are unknown parameters. As before, if the time-invariant
number of local government units is used, year dummies are automatically dropped.
This specification differs from the one in Section 4.4 in that it takes into account the
impact of neighboring states, i.e.,
∑
j
wijEjt, on government size at home, which is
captured by spatial-lag parameter ρ. Moreover, this specification allows for spatial
autocorrelation is errors, which is reflected by spatial-error parameter λ.
Spatial relations may be defined using a contiguity matrix. If a state i is adjacent
to another state j, for example, i is assigned a weight wij = 1Ni , where Ni is the total
number of i’s neighboring states. If i and j are nonadjacent, both are assigned a
weight wij = 0. Note that a jurisdiction is not considered to be a neighbor of itself,
i.e., wii = 0. Employed this chapter is a population-adjusted contiguity matrix. In
contrast to a regular contiguity matrix treating each neighbor equally, a population-
adjusted contiguity matrix gives more weight on populous states that are probably of
greater influence on others, i.e., wij =
Popj
PopNi
for i’s neighbor j, where Popj and PopNi
refer to the average annual populations of j and of all Ni neighbors of i, respectively.
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In this chapter all year-end populations between 1991 and 2008 are averaged to adjust
the simple contiguity relations.
For Equations (4.4) and (4.5), imposing λ = 0 leads to a spatial-lag model, while
with ρ = 0, a spatial-error model is formed. Ordinary least squares (OLS), if applied
to spatial-lag models, will give biased estimates by ignoring spatial lags. The OLS
estimates from spatial-error models are consistent in general. However, they are
ineffi cient even for large samples, and thus responsible for misleading hypothesis test
results.
Kelejian and Prucha (1998) propose a generalized spatial two-stage least squares
(GS2SLS) procedure to deal with both spatial lags and errors. The first step is to im-
plement two-stage least squares (2SLS) to estimate Equation (4.4), with endogenous
spatial lags instrumented by the weighted averages of neighbors’ exogenous char-
acteristics x’s. It is followed by using 2SLS residuals to estimate the spatial-error
parameter λ. Then multiply the matrix of right-hand-side variables on the left by(
I− λ̂W
)
to correct for spatial errors, where I is an NT × NT identity matrix,
W is an NT × NT block—diagonal spatial-weight matrix, N is the total number of
states, and T is the total number of time periods. Lastly, apply 2SLS again to the
transformed equation. The estimates produced by this procedure are expected to be
both consistent and effi cient.
4.6.2 Estimation Results
First, as in Section 4.4, total expenditures are first examined at the local level. In
Column (1) of Table 4.11, the estimate of the spatial parameter is positive and sta-
tistically significant. Since intergovernmental competition tends to limit government
99
size, a home state would have a smaller public sector, when its neighboring states
start to shrink their public sectors. This downsizing effect due to spatial interac-
tion among decentralized governments is consistent with the Leviathan hypothesis.
Evidence remains supportive, with the number of counties included and year dum-
mies dropped. The estimates in Column (2) suggest that fiscal decentralization, both
within a jurisdiction and across many, helps to rein in government size, with a num-
ber of characteristics controlled for, including significant spatial autocorrelation in
the error term. Positive spatial interaction in government size holds for state-local
total expenditures in Column (3) of Table 4.11. Whereas the number of counties has
an expected impact, its inclusion reverses the sign of the spatial-lag term in Column
(4). The interpretation of this finding has to be based on further investigation.
Shown in Table 4.12, the size of elementary and secondary education expenditures
are positively correlated across states, both at local and state-local levels, when the
number of school districts is not included. When it is included, more school districts
actually lead to a large government, as found in Section 4.4. Meanwhile, its inclusion
wipes off the downsizing effect due to spatial interaction across states.
Shown in Table 4.13, when examined at both local and state-local levels without
the number of counties, there is no significant spatial autocorrelation in the size of
police expenditures. The number of counties, when included, has a negative and
significant impact on the size of police expenditures, as found in Section 4.4. Its
inclusion also brings in mixed results at the two levels.
Positive spatial interaction holds in the size of state-local highway expenditures,
both with or without the number of counties included, in Table 4.14. As found in
Section 4.4, the included number of counties is positively and significantly correlated
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with government size.
Spatial interaction in the size of state-local welfare expenditures is insignificant
until the number of counties included in Table 4.15. The sign, however, suggests a
negative response to neighboring states in determining government size at home. The
number of counties does not seem critical, when it is included.
Given the mixed results obtained from different expenditure categories, the impact
of intergovernmental revenues and expenditures on government size is not yet clear.
Personal income per capita in general exhibits negative correlation with government
size at various significance levels.
4.7 Government Effi ciency and Fiscal Decentralization: Stochastic Fron-
tier and Spatial Analysis
4.7.1 Model Specification
Bringing together the ideas developed in Sections 4.5 and 4.6, this section inves-
tigates the impact of fiscal decentralization both within a state and across states on
government effi ciency.
In a recent study, Geys (2006) estimates an stochastic cost frontier without en-
vironmental factors to obtain effi ciency scores, and then evaluates the impacts of
spatially weighted effi ciency scores of neighbors and other environmental factors on
effi ciency achievement. This procedure can be applied to Models (1a), (2a), (3a),
and (4a), if they are successfully estimated. In the first step, Equation (4.2) or (4.3)
is estimated by ML. With obtained effi ciency scores, Equations (4.4) and (4.5) are
estimated by GS2SLS, where Eit now denotes the effi ciency score of the ith state in
tth year, and the definitions of the rest variables and parameters remain the same.
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Models (1b), (2b), (3b), and (4b) have included usual environmental factors in
stochastic cost frontier estimation. If they are successfully estimated, Equation (4.4)
to examine spatial interaction in effi ciency scores in the second step reduces to
Eit = ρ
∑
j
wijEjt + ψi + τ t + εit, (4.6)
with Equation (4.5) still applying.
4.7.2 Estimation Results
As reported in Section 4.5, only state-local highway and welfare data fit some of
the stochastic cost frontier models.
The estimates in Column (1) of Table 4.16 are based on Model (1a) effi ciency
estimates for highway expenditures. Both spatially weighted effi ciency scores and the
number of counties in a state are found insignificant. However, the spatial estimates
in Columns (3) and (4) based on Models (1b) and Column (2b), respectively, are
substantial evidence of diffusion in cost effi ciency among states. Column (5) based
on Model (3b) fails to provide further support.
Similar results are found for welfare expenditures. Under Model (1a), the impacts
of spatially weighted effi ciency scores and the number of counties in a state are both
trivial. In contrast, the effi ciency scores produced by Model (2b) exhibit positive
and statistically significant spatial autocorrelation, which, as well as that in Columns
(3) and (4) in Table 4.16, is supplementary to and consistent with the Geys (2006)
finding.
Intergovernmental grants, as seen in Section 4.5, is found to be associated with
lower cost effi ciency. As discussed before, the fact that grants increase local ex-
penditures does not provide suffi cient information for policy evaluation. It could
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be effi ciency-enhancing, if grants correct for positive externalities and the resulting
underprovision problem. If grants turn out to weaken local commitment to a hard
budget constraint, there will be wasteful expenditures and a loss in effi ciency.
4.8 Conclusion
Whether fiscal decentralization and resulting intergovernmental competition help
to cut off wasteful government spending and rein in growth of government size is a
widely discussed issue not only within academia, but also among politicians and the
general public. The opinions of the affi rmative side are put in short by economists as
the Leviathan hypothesis.
This chapter experiments with four model specifications, trying to bring in new
perspectives on testing the Leviathan hypothesis. Section 4.4 uses the original ap-
proach developed in the 1980s but with panel data to test the inverse relationship be-
tween the expenditure share in personal income and the number of local jurisdictions.
The Leviathan hypothesis is confirmed by results obtained from total expenditures
and police protection expenditures. Section 4.5 redefines the Leviathan hypothesis
as the direct relationship between government effi ciency and fiscal decentralization,
and test it using stochastic cost frontier models. Only one stochastic cost frontier
model containing environmental factors is successfully estimated and only with high-
way and with welfare expenditures. The available estimates are not in support of the
Leviathan hypothesis. Section 4.6 refers back to the original setup, but incorporates
government size in neighboring jurisdictions to capture the spatial impact of decen-
tralization. It is found, in terms of local total expenditures, that government size
of a state is smaller, if the state has more competing local governments and borders
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similar states with smaller public sectors. Section 4.7 combines the models developed
in Sections 4.5 and 4.6 to test the direct relationship between government effi ciency
and fiscal decentralization by both within- and across-jurisdiction measures. Lim-
ited evidence from highway and welfare expenditures suggests that a state is more
cost-effi cient in spending, if its neighbors exhibit cost effi ciency too, which is supple-
mentary to and consistent with the Geys (2006) finding.
To make it comparable with previous studies, this chapter uses the number of
local jurisdictions as a measure for decentralization. Little variation across years
is a notable disadvantage of this measure in a panel-data setting. This chapter in
fact collects one-year data only on this variable, which also result in individual fixed
effects being unidentifiable. Meanwhile, the number of local jurisdictions does not
fully capture decentralization and resulting competition among jurisdictions. The
positive/negative relationship between this measure and the running costs in the
public sector then could be an indicator of diseconomies/economies of scale. A more
appropriate measure for fiscal competition within a jurisdiction is expected in future
work.
Spatial analysis using effi ciency scores largely depends on successful estimation of
a stochastic cost frontier. In a panel-data setting in this chapter, possible treatments
to various kinds of heterogeneity, i.e., heterogeneity across observations, across time,
and across ineffi ciency terms, are screened with two popular distribution assumptions
on the ineffi ciency term, i.e., half-normality and truncated-normality. There certainly
are model specifications not exhausted, some of which may turn out to better fit the
data. Besides examining government expenditures at the local level in the current
framework, other stochastic frontier models are to be experimented with or under
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development in future work.
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
(48 Contiguous US States, 1991-2008)
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max
Local Total Expenditures (Million Dollars) 21000308 30519368 974619 259358520
—Elementary and Secondary Education 7472786 9303990 491909 70271479
—Police Protection 1007463 1540253 26194 13275335
State-Local Total Expenditures (Million Dollars) 37178034 48856514 2284766 415436973
—Elementary and Secondary Education 7504971 9321470 489625 70687156
—Police Protection 1172754 1714378 40755 14891583
—Highways 2063138 2099224 230394 15701894
—Public Welfare 5309665 7193235 152451 54612752
Local General Revenues 18581382 26784929 906894 226689172
State-Local General Revenues 31912644 40314367 2159799 327817087
Total IG Revenues to Local 7172473 11231177 253598 98973232
Total IG Revenues to State and Local 6386330 8057429 412929 57719733
Total IG Expenditures to Local (Million Dollars) 218233 884822 2 9478000
—Elementary and Secondary Education 18602 110529 0 1430380
—Police Protection 73 290 0 5522
Total IG Expenditure to State and Local (Thousand Dollars) 85956 404258 0 3663047
—Elementary and Secondary Education 4039221 5348164 129870 45883599
—Police Protection 21793 46243 0 389140
—Highways 254225 371532 0 4401883
—Public Welfare 1045987 3637597 0 28717980
Counties (per Capita) 0.021 0.020 0.001 0.094
School Districts (per Capita) 0.087 0.096 0.005 0.517
Income (Thousand Dollars per Capita) 27.707 7.244 13.741 56.272
Population Density (Population per Mile2) 270.331 929.068 4.714 10081.23
House Democrats (%) 53.066 15.825 16 100
Democrat Governor (=1) 0.007 0.083 0 1
School Enrollment (in Thousands) 954.556 1052.809 84.409 6441.557
Graduation Rate (%) 76.296 7.779 54.346 94.927
Vehicle-Mileage (in Millions) 5532.646 5505.732 587 32926.7
Drivers (in Thousands) 3887.482 3979.176 303.357 23697.67
TANF Recipients (in Thousands) 169.528 305.2047 0.49 2679.653
SSI Recipients (in Thousands) 136.5897 184.0154 3.895 1271.916
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Table 4.2: Government Size and Fiscal Decentralization: The Original Approach (a)
(Total Expenditures)
Local State-Local
logit(Expenditure Share) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Counties -3.050*** -1.741***
(0.358) (0.272)
IG Rev Share 0.082 0.163 0.756*** 2.332***
(0.049) (0.098) (0.125) (0.157)
Income -0.012*** -0.007*** -0.016*** -0.004**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Population Density 0.000007** 0.000004 0.000009*** 0.000025***
(0.000003) (0.000007) (0.000002) (0.000005)
House Democrats 0.0002 -0.0029*** -0.0001 -0.0011***
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Democrat Governor -0.053* 0.367*** -0.049* 0.164**
(0.025) (0.082) (0.024) (0.055)
Constant -1.847*** -1.757*** -1.145*** -1.575***
(0.033) (0.068) (0.044) (0.050)
State Dummies Yes No Yes No
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 864 864 864 864
Notes: (1) Standard errors in parentheses. (2) * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p <
0.001.
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Table 4.3: Government Size and Fiscal Decentralization: The Original Approach (b)
(Elementary and Secondary Education Expenditures)
Local State-Local
logit(Expenditure Share) (1) (2) (3) (4)
School Districts 0.404*** 0.407***
(0.043) (0.044)
IG Expenditure Share 0.021 1.786* -0.159*** 0.076*
(0.465) (0.721) (0.033) (0.035)
Income -0.005* -0.008*** -0.004* -0.006***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Population Density 0.000017*** 0.000007 0.000020*** 0.000011*
(0.000003) (0.000004) (0.000003) (0.000004)
House Democrats 0.0005 -0.0002 0.0008* -0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Democrat Governor -0.056 -0.030 -0.052 -0.025
(0.031) (0.048) (0.031) (0.049)
Constant -3.098*** -2.943*** -3.028*** -3.016***
(0.036) (0.030) (0.040) (0.041)
State Dummies Yes No Yes No
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 864 864 864 864
Notes: (1) Standard errors in parentheses. (2) * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p <
0.001.
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Table 4.4: Government Size and Fiscal Decentralization: The Original Approach (c)
(Police Protection Expenditures)
Local State-Local
logit(Expenditure Share) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Counties -5.161*** -4.721***
(0.421) (0.316)
IG Expenditure Share 1.015 -41.43** 0.0504 -0.458**
(3.639) (13.37) (0.154) (0.175)
Income -0.0234*** 0.00538*** -0.0173*** 0.00433***
(0.00162) (0.00113) (0.00157) (0.000838)
Population Density 0.0000114*** -0.0000113 0.0000131*** -0.0000105
(0.00000288) (0.00000859) (0.00000280) (0.00000651)
House Democrats 0.000508 -0.00184*** 0.000435 -0.00141***
(0.000307) (0.000514) (0.000297) (0.000387)
Democrat Governor -0.0405 -0.126 -0.0404 -0.0929
(0.0286) (0.0964) (0.0277) (0.0727)
Constant -5.022*** -5.227*** -4.942*** -5.019***
(0.0329) (0.0470) (0.0324) (0.0352)
State Dummies Yes No Yes No
Year Dummies Yes No Yes No
Observations 864 864 864 864
Notes: (1) Standard errors in parentheses. (2) * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 4.5: Government Size and Fiscal Decentralization: The Original Approach (d)
(State-Local Highway Expenditures)
State-Local
logit(Expenditure Share) (1) (2)
Counties 7.102***
(0.413)
IG Expenditure Share -0.662*** -0.442***
(0.112) (0.078)
Income -0.017*** -0.031***
(0.003) (0.002)
Population Density 0.00001 -0.000005
(0.00001) (0.000008)
House Democrats -0.001 -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001)
Democrat Governor -0.073 -0.152
(0.054) (0.092)
Constant -3.851*** -3.435***
(0.062) (0.062)
State Dummies Yes No
Year Dummies Yes Yes
Observations 864 864
Notes: (1) Standard errors in parentheses. (2) * p < 0.05,
** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 4.6: Government Size and Fiscal Decentralization: The Original Approach (e)
(State-Local Public Welfare Expenditures)
State-Local
logit(Expenditure Share) (1) (2)
Counties 1.144*
(0.459)
IG Expenditure Share -0.665*** 0.452***
(0.101) (0.074)
Income -0.023*** -0.024***
(0.003) (0.002)
Population Density 0.000004 0.00002*
(0.000005) (0.00001)
House Democrats -0.002** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001)
Democrat Governor 0.088 0.118
(0.053) (0.100)
Constant -3.218*** -3.727***
(0.062) (0.063)
State Dummies Yes No
Year Dummies Yes Yes
Observations 864 864
Notes: (1) Standard errors in parentheses. (2) * p < 0.05,
** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 4.7: Government Effi ciency and Fiscal Decentralization: Stochastic Frontier Estimation (a)
(State-Local Highway Expenditures)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(Expenditure) Model (1a) Model (1a) Model (1b) Model (2b) Model (3b)
ln(Vehicle-Mileage) (y2a) 0.187* 0.187* 0.078 0.099 0.247
(0.078) (0.078) (0.502) (0.070) (0.551)
ln(Drivers) (y2b) -0.066 -0.066 -0.059 -0.063 -0.730
(0.043) (0.043) (0.033) (0.033) (0.774)
0.5×(y2a)×(y2a) -0.084
(0.161)
0.5×(y2a)×(y2b) 0.169
(0.240)
0.5×(y2b)×(y2b) -0.004
(0.111)
Constant 4.306*** 4.306*** 5.191*** 5.043*** 5.999
(0.631) (0.631) (0.590) (0.569) (13.330)
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes —
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes —
Counties -0.219
(0.146)
IG Expenditure Share -0.458*** -0.125*** -10.125*** -4.399 -0.677***
(0.079) (0.028) (1.920) (2.433) (0.109)
Income -0.0006 0.0003 0.037* 0.003 -0.001
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.014) (0.005) (0.003)
Population Density 0.000002 0.000004 0.0002* 0.0001 0.000003
(0.000004) (0.000003) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.000005)
House Democrats -0.0009* 0.00001 0.008 0.004 -0.001*
(0.0004) (0.00018) (0.005) (0.003) (0.001)
Democrat Governor -0.057 -0.031 -2.684* -2.519 -0.064
(0.039) (0.033) (1.301) (3.803) (0.052)
Constant 1.227*** 1.123*** -4.646*** -0.504 0.803
(0.036) (0.018) (0.516) (0.508) (13.238)
State Dummies Yes No — — Yes
Year Dummies No No — — Yes
Observations 864 864 864 864 864
Notes: (1) Standard errors in parentheses. (2) * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Figure 4.1: Kernel Density Estimates of Cost Effi ciency (a)
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Table 4.8: 18-Year Average Rankings of Cost Effi ciency (a)
(State-Local Highway Expenditures)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FIPS State Model (1a) Model (1b) Model (2b) Model (3b)
1 Alabama (AL) 44 36 39 36
4 Arizona (AZ) 22 46 38 32
5 Arkansas (AR) 18 29 22 22
6 California (CA) 10 34 23 48
8 Colorado (CO) 9 23 18 18
9 Connecticut (CT) 7 5 5 25
10 Delaware (DE) 27 14 15 6
12 Florida (FL) 30 16 19 42
13 Georgia (GA) 3 2 2 45
16 Idaho (ID) 45 42 44 14
17 Illinois (IL) 25 27 29 35
18 Indiana (IN) 43 43 43 39
19 Iowa (IA) 29 45 40 8
20 Kansas (KS) 31 33 35 9
21 Kentucky (KY) 21 17 14 24
22 Louisiana (LA) 17 10 11 28
23 Maine (ME) 37 20 26 13
24 Maryland (MD) 14 32 24 34
25 Massachusetts (MA) 1 1 1 26
26 Michigan (MI) 47 48 48 46
27 Minnesota (MN) 41 40 42 15
28 Mississippi (MS) 26 30 28 19
29 Missouri (MO) 33 31 37 30
30 Montana (MT) 42 21 27 4
31 Nebraska (NE) 46 41 46 11
32 Nevada (NV) 28 15 20 10
33 New Hampshire (NH) 39 22 32 17
34 New Jersey (NJ) 8 6 7 33
35 New Mexico (NM) 2 3 3 7
36 New York (NY) 35 12 13 37
37 North Carolina (NC) 38 26 30 41
38 North Dakota (ND) 12 28 25 3
39 Ohio (OH) 48 44 47 44
40 Oklahoma (OK) 19 37 33 29
41 Oregon (OR) 20 47 45 21
42 Pennsylvania (PA) 6 9 9 38
44 Rhode Island (RI) 11 4 4 27
45 South Carolina (SC) 5 7 6 43
46 South Dakota (SD) 36 25 34 2
47 Tennessee (TN) 13 38 31 40
48 Texas (TX) 15 8 10 47
49 Utah (UT) 4 11 8 20
50 Vermont (VT) 34 35 36 5
51 Virginia (VA) 16 19 17 31
53 Washington (WA) 24 24 21 23
54 West Virginia (WV) 32 13 12 12
55 Wisconsin (WI) 40 39 41 16
56 Wyoming (WY) 23 18 16 1
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Figure 4.2: Spatial Distribution of Effi ciency Rankings (a)
(State-Local Highway Expenditures)
44
22
18
10
9
7
27
30
3
45
25 43
29
31
21
17
37
14
1
47
42
26
33
41
46
28
39
8
2
35
38
12
48
19
20
6
11
5
36
13
15
4
34
16
24
32
40
23
(40,48]
(32,40]
(24,32]
(16,24]
(8,16]
[0,8]
Model (1a)
115
Figure 4.2: Spatial Distribution of Effi ciency Rankings (a) (Continued)
(State-Local Highway Expenditures)
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Figure 4.2: Spatial Distribution of Effi ciency Rankings (a) (Continued)
(State-Local Highway Expenditures)
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Figure 4.2: Spatial Distribution of Effi ciency Rankings (a) (Continued)
(State-Local Highway Expenditures)
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Table 4.9: Government Effi ciency and Fiscal Decentralization: Stochastic Frontier
Estimation (b)
(State-Local Public Welfare Expenditures)
(1) (2) (3)
ln(Expenditure) Model (1a) Model (1a) Model (2b)
ln(TANF Rec) (y3a) 0.022 0.022 0.005
(0.025) (0.025) (0.026)
ln(SSI Rec) (y3b) -0.016 -0.016 0.155
(0.125) (0.125) (0.118)
0.5×(y3a)×(y3a) 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.071***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
0.5×(y3a)×(y3b) -0.136*** -0.136*** -0.101***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023)
0.5×(y3b)×(y3b) 0.059* 0.059* 0.011
(0.030) (0.030) (0.029)
Constant 5.732*** 5.732*** 5.029***
(0.350) (0.350) (0.329)
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Counties -0.0288
(0.0161)
IG Expenditure Share -0.039*** -0.004 -0.866***
(0.008) (0.002) (0.118)
Income -0.00010* -0.00003 -0.001
(0.00005) (0.00004) (0.002)
Population Density 0.00000002 0.00000005 0.00000123
(0.00000043) (0.00000031) (0.00000491)
House Democrats -0.00015*** -0.00003 -0.003***
(0.00004) (0.00002) (0.001)
Democrat Governor 0.005 0.004 0.060
(0.004) (0.003) (0.048)
Constant 1.049*** 1.040*** 0.610***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.101)
State Dummies Yes No —
Year Dummies No No —
Observations 864 864 864
Notes: (1) Standard errors in parentheses. (2) * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01,
*** p < 0.001.
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Figure 4.3: Kernel Density Estimates of Cost Effi ciency (b)
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Table 4.10: 18-Year Average Rankings of Cost Effi ciency (b)
(State-Local Public Welfare Expenditures)
(1) (2)
FIPS State Model (1a) Model (2b)
1 Alabama (AL) 19 21
4 Arizona (AZ) 11 43
5 Arkansas (AR) 48 32
6 California (CA) 26 48
8 Colorado (CO) 9 46
9 Connecticut (CT) 23 37
10 Delaware (DE) 6 7
12 Florida (FL) 22 9
13 Georgia (GA) 30 25
16 Idaho (ID) 47 1
17 Illinois (IL) 36 39
18 Indiana (IN) 16 27
19 Iowa (IA) 46 15
20 Kansas (KS) 13 8
21 Kentucky (KY) 37 19
22 Louisiana (LA) 4 28
23 Maine (ME) 45 17
24 Maryland (MD) 31 31
25 Massachusetts (MA) 5 44
26 Michigan (MI) 18 29
27 Minnesota (MN) 44 38
28 Mississippi (MS) 10 36
29 Missouri (MO) 27 12
30 Montana (MT) 17 13
31 Nebraska (NE) 35 6
32 Nevada (NV) 15 22
33 New Hampshire (NH) 1 26
34 New Jersey (NJ) 7 40
35 New Mexico (NM) 3 16
36 New York (NY) 40 47
37 North Carolina (NC) 25 45
38 North Dakota (ND) 14 5
39 Ohio (OH) 34 33
40 Oklahoma (OK) 2 23
41 Oregon (OR) 8 14
42 Pennsylvania (PA) 33 41
44 Rhode Island (RI) 21 42
45 South Carolina (SC) 32 10
46 South Dakota (SD) 43 4
47 Tennessee (TN) 20 35
48 Texas (TX) 41 20
49 Utah (UT) 28 3
50 Vermont (VT) 24 18
51 Virginia (VA) 38 30
53 Washington (WA) 29 11
54 West Virginia (WV) 12 24
55 Wisconsin (WI) 42 34
56 Wyoming (WY) 39 2
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Figure 4.4: Spatial Distribution of Effi ciency Rankings (b)
(State-Local Public Welfare Expenditures)
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Figure 4.4: Spatial Distribution of Effi ciency Rankings (b) (Continued)
(State-Local Public Welfare Expenditures)
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Table 4.11: Government Size and Fiscal Decentralization: A Spatial Perspective (a)
(Total Expenditures)
Local State-Local
logit(Expenditure Share) (1) (2) (3) (4)
W[logit(Expenditure Share)] 0.751*** 1.035*** 1.174*** -0.572***
(0.215) (0.236) (0.118) (0.109)
Counties -2.387*** -2.007***
(0.406) (0.273)
IG Rev Share 0.116* 0.127 0.916*** 2.357***
(0.050) (0.094) (0.121) (0.155)
Income -0.012*** -0.001 -0.016*** -0.005***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Population Density 0.000008** 0.000001 0.000014*** 0.000028***
(0.000003) (0.000007) (0.000002) (0.000005)
House Democrats 0.0004 -0.0018*** 0.0002 -0.0012***
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Democrat Governor -0.044 0.363*** -0.041 0.160**
(0.025) (0.081) (0.024) (0.054)
Constant -0.673** -0.183 -0.074 -2.093***
(0.247) (0.402) (0.085) (0.140)
W(Error) 0.416*** 0.163*** 0.472*** 0.022
(0.050) (0.043) (0.050) (0.042)
State Dummies Yes No Yes No
Year Dummies Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 864 864 864 864
Notes: (1) Standard errors in parentheses. (2) * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 4.12: Government Size and Fiscal Decentralization: A Spatial Perspective (b)
(Elementary and Secondary Education Expenditures)
Local State-Local
logit(Expenditure Share) (1) (2) (3) (4)
W[logit(Expenditure Share)] 1.737*** 0.148 1.383*** -0.186
(0.412) (0.152) (0.276) (0.184)
School Districts 0.401*** 0.409***
(0.045) (0.046)
IG Expenditure Share 0.019 1.779* -0.147*** 0.113**
(0.428) (0.703) (0.032) (0.035)
Income -0.005** -0.009*** -0.004* -0.007***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Population Density 0.000020*** 0.000006 0.000022*** 0.000009*
(0.000003) (0.000004) (0.000003) (0.000004)
House Democrats 0.0012*** -0.0001 0.0013*** -0.0004
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Democrat Governor -0.044 -0.024 -0.040 -0.010
(0.031) (0.048) (0.031) (0.049)
Constant 0.212 -2.446*** -0.268 -3.341***
(0.723) (0.363) (0.502) (0.424)
W(Error) 0.435*** 0.198*** 0.413*** 0.233***
(0.047) (0.048) (0.049) (0.048)
State Dummies Yes No Yes No
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 864 864 864 864
Notes: (1) Standard errors in parentheses. (2) * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 4.13: Government Size and Fiscal Decentralization: A Spatial Perspective (c)
(Police Protection Expenditures)
Local State-Local
logit(Expenditure Share) (1) (2) (3) (4)
W[logit(Expenditure Share)] 0.179 -1.056*** -0.085 -0.264
(0.115) (0.157) (0.145) (0.146)
Counties -6.931*** -5.539***
(0.470) (0.376)
IG Expenditure Share 1.493 -25.507* 0.046 -0.499**
(3.670) (12.892) (0.154) (0.180)
Income -0.023*** 0.012*** -0.017*** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Population Density 0.000012*** -0.00002** 0.000013*** -0.00001*
(0.000003) (0.00001) (0.000003) (0.00001)
House Democrats 0.0006 -0.002** 0.0004 -0.0011**
(0.0003) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Democrat Governor -0.039 -0.121 -0.041 -0.086
(0.029) (0.092) (0.028) (0.072)
Constant -3.285*** -9.437*** -4.547*** -6.054***
(0.547) (0.618) (0.726) (0.552)
W(Error) 0.057 0.265*** -0.027 0.262***
(0.072) (0.047) (0.065) (0.048)
State Dummies Yes No Yes No
Year Dummies Yes No Yes No
Observations 864 864 864 864
Notes: (1) Standard errors in parentheses. (2) * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 4.14: Government Size and Fiscal Decentralization: A Spatial Perspective (d)
(State-Local Highway Expenditures)
State-Local
logit(Expenditure Share) (1) (2)
W[logit(Expenditure Share)] 0.516** 0.165**
(0.180) (0.055)
Counties 6.915***
(0.432)
IG Expenditure Share -0.619*** -0.452***
(0.112) (0.080)
Income -0.014*** -0.030***
(0.003) (0.002)
Population Density 0.00001 -0.00001
(0.00001) (0.00001)
House Democrats -0.0002 -0.004***
(0.0006) (0.001)
Democrat Governor -0.069 -0.163
(0.054) (0.092)
Constant -0.492 -2.411***
(0.781) (0.213)
W(Error) -0.095 0.064
(0.053) (0.055)
State Dummies Yes No
Year Dummies Yes Yes
Observations 864 864
Notes: (1) Standard errors in parentheses. (2) * p < 0.05,
** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 4.15: Government Size and Fiscal Decentralization: A Spatial Perspective (e)
(State-Local Public Welfare Expenditures)
State-Local
logit(Expenditure Share) (1) (2)
W[logit(Expenditure Share)] -0.006 -0.414***
(0.151) (0.113)
Counties 0.223
(0.497)
IG Expenditure Share -0.659*** 0.340***
(0.101) (0.067)
Income -0.024*** -0.032***
(0.003) (0.002)
Population Density 0.000004 0.00001
(0.000005) (0.00001)
House Democrats -0.002** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001)
Democrat Governor 0.087 0.124
(0.053) (0.092)
Constant -2.704*** -3.612***
(0.493) (0.213)
W(Error) 0.081 0.480***
(0.055) (0.047)
State Dummies Yes No
Year Dummies Yes Yes
Observations 864 864
Notes: (1) Standard errors in parentheses. (2) * p < 0.05,
** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 4.16: Government Effi ciency and Fiscal Decentralization: Stochastic Frontier and Spatial Analysis (a)
(State-Local Highway Expenditures)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cost Effi ciency Model (1a) Model (1a) Model (1b) Model (2b) Model (3b)
W(Cost Effi ciency) 0.497 0.446 0.774*** 0.735** -0.053
(0.278) (0.327) (0.197) (0.268) (0.217)
Counties -0.160
(0.144)
IG Expenditure Share -0.431*** -0.100**
(0.077) (0.031)
Income -0.0007 0.0001
(0.0005) (0.0004)
Population Density 0.000004 0.000005
(0.000004) (0.000003)
House Democrats -0.0007* -0.0001
(0.0004) (0.0002)
Dem Governor -0.056 -0.029
(0.038) (0.032)
Constant 0.615 0.616 0.264 0.292 6.609***
(0.314) (0.373) (0.218) (0.300) (0.495)
W(Error) -0.007 -0.035 -0.007 -0.018 0.541***
(0.052) (0.053) (0.052) (0.053) (0.046)
State Dummies Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies No No No No Yes
Observations 864 864 864 864 864
Notes: (1) Standard errors in parentheses. (2) * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
129
Table 4.17: Government Effi ciency and Fiscal Decentralization: Stochastic Frontier
and Spatial Analysis (b)
(State-Local Public Welfare Expenditures)
(1) (2) (3)
Cost Effi ciency Model (1a) Model (1a) Model (2b)
W(Cost Effi ciency) 0.049 -0.273 0.275***
(0.228) (0.493) (0.075)
Counties -0.029
(0.016)
IG Expenditure Share -0.039*** -0.004
(0.008) (0.003)
Income -0.0001* -0.00004
(0.0001) (0.00004)
Population Density 0.00000004 0.0000001
(0.00000043) (0.0000003)
House Democrats -0.00015*** -0.00003
(0.00004) (0.00002)
Democrat Governor 0.005 0.004
(0.004) (0.003)
Constant 0.995*** 1.305** 1.242***
(0.222) (0.479) (0.111)
W(Error) 0.062 0.064 0.016
(0.049) (0.049) (0.054)
State Dummies Yes No Yes
Year Dummies No No No
Observations 864 864 864
Notes: (1) Standard errors in parentheses. (2) * p < 0.05, ** p <
0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Copyright c© Lóngjìn Chén 2012
130
Chapter 5 Conclusion
This dissertation examines multiple state and local expenditure categories in the
United States to expand understanding of fiscal federalism and spatial interactions
among governments. Chapter 2 serves as a less technical introduction to the data
and describles a few stylized facts about government expenditures on elementary and
secondary education, police protection, highways, and public welfare. Chapter 2 first
exhibits the trends of the US state and local government expenditures between 1977
and 2008. Despite that their budget shares did not change much, government expen-
ditures in all the four categories grew substantially over the past thirty-two years,
in both nominal and real terms. Most state governments were not responsible for
financing elementary and secondary education until 1982. Although elementary and
secondary education remains a primary function of local governments, state govern-
ment had made up more than one third of the total spending in this category in 2008.
Most expenditures on police protection are spent by local governments. Police pro-
tection and highways are two categories in which the shares between state and local
governments stayed stable over the thirty-two years. Highway expenditures, however,
are mainly allocated by state governments. Public welfare expenditures grew fast at
the state level, with more responsibility shifted from the federal government. At the
local level, the trend in public welfare expenditures has been flat or even declining,
with inflation taken into account. Chapter 2 also uses Kentucky and its neighbor-
ing states to illustrate spatial correlation in government expenditures. According to
the results, Kentucky’s government expenditures are positively correlated with its
131
average neighbor in each category examined.
Chapter 3 focuses on police protection expenditures and its interactions with crime
rates. In the literature on the relationship between police resources and crime rates,
there is less empirical evidence of “more police, less crime”than that of “more crime,
more police”. To deal with endogeneity, two instrumental variables, the fatality rate
and the incarceration rate, are proposed, respectively, for police expenditures and
crime rates in single equations as well as in simultaneous systems. The results based
on the instrumental-variable approach support the intuition of both “more police,
less crime”and “more crime, more police”. Furthermore, bringing two literatures to-
gether, this chapter examines the relationship between police and crime from a spatial
perspective. Specifically, it seeks the answers to whether police expenditures or crime
rates in a state are affected by police expenditures or by crime rates of neighboring
states. Police expenditures and crime rates are both found exhibiting positive and
significant spatial autocorrelation. Meanwhile, it is shown that crime rates signifi-
cantly decline in a state, if neighboring states spend more on police protection. This
across-border deterrence effect is an indication of positive externalities. Last, crime
rates of neighboring states, as the coeffi cient estimate is statistically insignificant, do
not seem considered as a factor in determining police expenditures in the surrounded
state. The results call attention to spatial spillover effects that may be overlooked in
policy decision-making.
Chapter 4 examines government expenditures on elementary and secondary edu-
cation, police protection, highways, and public welfare. The goal of this chapter is
to search for a better model specification to test the Leviathan hypothesis. First,
in spirit of the original approach but with panel data, the inverse relationship be-
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tween the expenditure share in personal income and the number of local jurisdictions
is tested. Affi rmative evidence is found in total expenditures and police protection
expenditures. Second, taking the Leviathan hypothesis more seriously, cost effi ciency
in government spending is estimated by various stochastic cost frontier models with
the number of local jurisdictions being an environmental factor. No direct relation-
ship between cost effi ciency and the number of local jurisdictions is found, given a
limited number of successfully estimated models. Third, the original setup is reexam-
ined but with government size in neighboring states included to capture the impact
of decentralization across states. In local total expenditures, a smaller government
size is seen promoted not only by more competing local governments within a state,
but also by neighboring states that similarly have smaller public sectors. Finally,
techniques in both stochastic frontier analysis and spatial econometrics are combined
to test whether cost effi ciency in government spending exhibits positive correlation
with itself across state borders and with the number of local jurisdictions. In two
models supplementary to Geys (2006), similar positive spatial autocorrelation in cost
effi ciency is found in state-local highway and welfare expenditures.
Despite different focuses, both Chapters 3 and 4 examine government expendi-
tures and their outcomes. Chapter 3 has to do with police protection expenditures
and crime rates. In terms of reflecting police productivity, crime rates prevented
might be a better measure than crime rates reported. The data on prevented crime,
however, are often unobservable. Whereas crime clear-up rates are used instead in
some studies (e.g., Barros and Alves, 2005), the data on this measure are not avail-
able for most US states and counties. Since crime rates reported are not an direct
output of police expenditures, they are not brought to stochastic frontier estimation
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in Chapter 4. Nevertheless, the question of how fiscal decentralization affects cost
effi ciency in police spending is important too. Government expenditures and their
outcomes covered in Chapter 4, e.g., elementary and secondary education expendi-
tures and high school graduation rates, may be explored in the framework developed
in Chapter 3. The main challenge, as with police expenditures and crime rates, would
be finding proper instrumental variables to tackle simultaneity. Hanushek (1989), for
example, finds that education resources, e.g., class size, teachers’educational back-
ground, do not have significant or systematic effects on student performance. Given
that simultaneity is properly handled, spatial interactions among expenditure cate-
gories, among expenditure outcomes, and between one expenditure category and the
outcome of another expenditure category are ready to be investigated in a larger
simultaneous system.
The findings in the previous chapters have several implications for policy-making
in a federalist system. First, before reaching a decision, policy makers should eval-
uate how a policy would affect their neighbors, and, more importantly, how their
neighbors would react to it. A policy design overlooking potential spillover effects
across jurisdictions may end up with reduced effectiveness and unintended conse-
quences. Second, to ineffi ciency problems resulting from externalities, coordination is
a standard solution. Coordination may come from a higher level of government. For
example, the federal government founded the Community Oriented Policing Services
(COPS) program, aiming to equalize state and local police services. It is also possi-
ble that a cooperative mechanism is established by governments at the same level to
internalize externalities. For example, Maryland started dialogues with Virginia and
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Washington, DC in 2008 on sharing information about violent offenders1. Nowadays,
this partnership has been extended to more neighboring states, including Delaware,
New York, and Pennsylvania2. Third, policy makers should not only recognize the
role of the federal government, for example, in policy coordination and effi ciency
restoration, but also be aware of enhancement in effi ciency and accountability that
results from policy experimentation and diffusion among competing states. When
intergovernmental competition is welfare-enhancing is an important question, both
theoretically and empirically. Despite not offering a simple answers to this question,
spatial analysis in this dissertation should help to widen the perspective on policy
making.
As spatial interaction is likely to be stronger at the local level than at the state
level, the developed analytical framework is expected to be applied to local-level data
in future work to verify the results in this dissertation as well as to search for new
findings. Spatial impacts can also been more accurately estimated with more proper
measures for both dependent and independent variables. For example, as discussed
previously, a time-variant measure for the degree of intergovernmental competition
within a state is in need. Besides, the more relevant the output measures of govern-
ment expenditures, the greater odds of successfully estimating an stochastic frontier
model. The search for appropriate output measures, especially of police expenditures,
is on the to-do list as well for future work. Last, as a commonly used tool in policy
analysis, especially in macroeconomic contexts, impulse-response functions help to
understand the dynamic relationship between two variables of interest, e.g., crime
rates at home and police expenditures of neighbors. In future work, impulse-response
1“Md., Del. to Share Crime Information,”The Baltimore Sun, August 18, 2011.
2“Maryland, Nearby States Sharing More Crime Data.”The Gazette, June 25, 2012.
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analysis is to be conducted to reveal more policy implications.
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